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FREE SPEECH AND OBSCENITY LAW:
TOWARD A MORAL THEORY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
DAVID A. J. RICHARDSt
The jurisprudential inquiry into the relation of law and
morals has recently taken a striking new form that promises to
reinvigorate the classical inquiry in a fruitful and controversial
way. In the place of the traditional inquiry into the necessary
logical relations between concepts of law, or legal systems, and
substantive moral values, this new approach starts from the prem-
ise that in America written state and federal constitutions liter-
ally incorporate substantive moral criteria. Thus recent commen-
tary gives voice to the deep intellectual need for a satisfactory
fusion of constitutional law and moral theory in the absence of
which "[c]onstitutional law can make no genuine advance."' Con-
currently, it is natural to apply moral theory to the analysis of
particular constitutional provisions. The relation between moral-
ity and constitutional law is not, obviously, an exact one.2 None-
theless, certain provisions of the Constitution, such as the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, crucially impli-
cate moral ideas so that the analysis of the moral idea funda-
mentally illuminates the interpretation of the constitutional pro-
vision.
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Consistent with this general enterprise, this Article endeavors
to show how moral theory may significantly clarify constitutional
adjudications by focusing on the recent set of obscenity cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court, especially Miller v. California4 and
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton.5 Miller and Paris Adult Theatre dra-
matically raise the question of the proper relation of moral and
legal analysis in constitutional adjudication, for these cases relate
to the fundamental structural interpretation of one of the most
morally informed provisions of the federal Constitution, the first
amendment.
Whatever the historical obscurities which surround the pro-
posal and adoption of the first amendment, 6 there is little ques-
tion that the amendment was part of and gives expression to a
developing moral theory regarding the equal liberties of men
which had been given expression by Milton 7 and Locke 8 and
which was being given or was to be given expression by Rousseau)
and Kant. 10 The technical legal history of free speech in England
and America prior to the adoption of the first amendment ob-
viously renders doubtful any consensus on the specific application
of the amendment;" l a consensus, to the extent it existed, was
one on the generalities of a political compromise that concealed
future divergences of interpretation.' 2 In such circumstances,
the explanation of underlying moral theory is a fortiori useful.
But even if the legal history appeared to be definitive, it would,
in fact, be seriously incomplete if it were not understood in the
light of a history of evolving moral ideas to which the first amend-
ment, like all laws, gives expression. The critical examination of
these moral ideas not only helps to complete the legal history but
also clarifies the deeper moral purposes which the first amend-
4 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
5 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
6 See L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY
AMERICAN HISTORY 176-309 (1960).
'J. MILTON, Areopagitica, in THE PROSE OFJOHN MILTON 265-334 (1967).
1J. LOCKE, Second Treatise, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285-446 (2d ed. P.
Laslett ed. 1967); J. LOCKE, 6 WORKS (1823, reprinted 1963) [hereinafter LETTERS CON-
CERNING TOLERATION].
'J.-J. ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES
(G.D.H. Cole transl. 1950).
,l Kant, Concerning the Coimon Saying: This May Be True in Theory, But Does Not Apply
in Practice, in SOCIETY, LAW, AND MORALITY 159-72 (F. Olafson ed. 1961); I. KANT, THE
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OFJUSTICE (I. Ladd ed. 1965).
SSee L. LEVY, supra note 6, at 1-175.
'2 See id. 176-309. This seems to me the most plausible interpretation of the data pre-
sented by Levy.
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ment subserves and thus guides the proper direction of its inter-
pretation.
The purpose of this Article is to explain a contractarian the-
ory of the first amendment and to apply it to the recent obscenity
cases. This moral theory is part of a developing line of thought
familiar, in the work of Locke, 13 to the framers of the Bill of
Rights and developed as well by other philosophers.1
4
The examination of the constitutional law of obscenity, as
established in Miller and Paris Adult Theatre, is a crucial test for
this contractarian approach. These cases claim to identify a cer-
tain class of clearly communicative expressions which fail even
to enter into the structure of first amendment analysis. It is im-
portant to know whether the Court's view is fundamentally con-
sistent with the moral theory underlying the first amendment. If
these difficult cases can be decisively analyzed, other cases may
follow more easily.
A necessary preliminary step, however, is to examine the very
notion of the obscene. The contours of the notion are not self-
evident. In order to understand the law of obscenity, some pre-
cision must be given to this notion itself.
I. THE CONCEPT OF THE OBSCENE
In giving a satisfactory philosophical explication 15 of the
notion of the obscene, one wishes to provide a constructive ac-
count which will clarify the notion itself, its connections to related
notions, such as the pornographic, the indecent, and the immoral,
its uses in speech, and its relations to fundamental attitudes which
explain how the notion comes to have moving appeal to conduct.
Initially, we must describe some general marks of the obscene.
Then, a constructive account of the notion will be proposed and,
finally, an attempt will be made to connect the account to crucially
related notions, especially the pornographic.
A. The Marks of the Obscene
The etymology of "obscene" is obscure. The Oxford English
Dictionary notes that the etymology is "doubtful,"' 6 while Web-
ster's suggests a derivation from the Latin ob, meaning "to," "be-
I" See note 8 supra.
'4 See note 9 supra; Kant, supra note 10, at 164, 166-67; I. KANT, supra note 10, at 58,
72,80, 111-12, 119, 129.
I" For an account of criteria of theoretical adequacy, see D.A.J. RICHARDS, A THE-
ORY OF REASONS FOR ACTIONS 3-10 (1971).
'6 See 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 0.26 (1961).
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fore," "against," and the Latin caenum, meaning "filth."'17 Other
commentators suggest alternative derivations from the Latin
obscurus, meaning "concealed,"'1 8 or a derivation as a corruption
of the Latin scena meaning "what takes place off stage."'19 In the
latter sense, blinding Gloucester on stage in King Lear would have
been an obscenity for a Greek playwright like Sophocles (thus,
Oedipus is blinded off stage), but it was not for an Elizabethan
playwright like Shakespeare who was imbued with the blood-
thirstiness of Senecan tragedy.
The standard dictionary definition of "obscene" turns on
notions of what is offensive to decency, filthy, or disgusting.
20
While contemporary legal discussions emphasize the applicabil-
ity of "obscene" to depictions, it is clearly significantly applied
to acts themselves. Shakespeare, for example, speaks of an ob-
scene deed,2' and Sartre discusses obscene movements of the
body.22 In the law, it is notable that the earliest English obscenity
conviction was for obscene acts. 23 Judicial decisions24 and lega
2 5
1 7
See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1557 (1965).
18 Kaplan, Obscenity as an Esthetic Category, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 544, 550 (1955).
For a critique of the etymology, see van den Haag, Quia Ineptum, in "To DEPRAVE AND
CORRUPT.. ." 111, 119 n.2 (J. Chandos ed. 1962) [hereinafter To DEPRAVE AND CORRUPT].
,9 H. ELLIS, ON LIFE AND SEX 175 (1962); G. GORER, THE DANGER OF EQUALITY 218
(1966); Alien, The Writer and the Frontiers of Tolerance, in To DEPRAVE AND CORRUPT, supra
note 18, at 141, 147.
2 
See notes 16 & 17 supra.
21 "0, forfend it, God, that, in a Christian climate, souls refin'd should show so hei-
nous, black, obscene a deed!" W. SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD iI, act IV, scene 1. The deed in
question is a subject's judging his king.
2 2 
J.p. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 401-02 (H. Barnes transl. 1956); cf. the no-
tion of "the jest obscene," as used in Nitocris' condemnation of her son in Handel, Bel-
shazzar, act 1, scene 4 (1744).
21 Sir Charles Sydlyes Case, 83 Eng. Rep. 1146 (K.B. 1663). Sir Charles Sedley was
here convicted "for shewing himself naked in a balkony, and throwing down bottles (pist
in) vi & armis among the people in Covent Garden, contra pacem and to the scandal of the
Government." Id. at 1146-47. Sedley's conduct was condemned for its intrinsic obscenity
as well as on the four additional grounds of indecent exposure, blasphemy, throwing
missiles containing urine, and inciting to the small riot that ensued. For a reconstruction
of these events, see Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARV. L. REV. 40,
41-43 (1938). One commentary on these events states that Sedley also excreted in public.
See A. CRAIG, THE BANNED BOOKS OF ENGLAND 23-24 (1962); D. THOMAS, A LONG TIME
BURNING 81 (1969).
24 Thus, the prurient interest test for obscenity, established in Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957), and reaffirmed in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)
and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), is defined in terms of"a shame-
ful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion." See note 58 infra. See also Roth v. Gold-
man, 172 F.2d 788, 790 (2d Cir. 1949) (Frank, J., concurring); United States v. Kenner-
ley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); State v. Lerner, 81 N.E.2d 282, 289, 294 (Ohio C.P.
Hamilton County 1948).
25 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, Comment at 1, 10, 29-31 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1957).
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and general26 commentary emphasize the connections of the ob-
scene to the notion of shame. It is clear that in European thought
the notion of the obscene has long been connected to the scato-
logical 27 and the sexually lascivious, 2 8 a connection emphasized
in Anglo-American legal history.29 This history also makes clear
the significant relation of the obscene to the notion of the mor-
26 See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 18, at 556. See also United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796,
809 n.21 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring), aff'd 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Cf. Rosen v.
United States, 161 U.S. 29, 31 (1896).
27 For example, Alexander Pope in his remarkable denunciations of Curl in The Dun-
dad uses "obscene" in excretory contexts. Thus, noting a pile of excrement:
Which Curl's Corinna chanc'd that morn to make:...
Here fortun'd Curl to slide;...
Obscene with filth the miscreant lies bewray'd,
Fal'n in the plash his wickedness had laid ....
A. POPE, THE DUNCIAD 299 (J. Sutherland ed. 1963) (first published 1728, 1743).
Or, Curl's goddess, Cloacina, heeding his prayer to rise from feces,
List'ning delighted to the jest unclean
Of link-boys vile, and watermen obscene;
She oft had favour'd him, and favours yet.
Renew'd by ordure's sympathetic force....
Vig'rous he rises; from th'effluvia strong
Imbibes new life, and scours and stinks along;
Re-passes Lintot, vindicates the race,
Nor heeds the brown dishonours of his face.
Id. 300. For a discussion of the relation of Curl (the defendant in Rex v. Curl, 93 Eng.
Rep. 849 (K.B. 1727) (the first case to hold obscene libel to be a common law misde-
meanor)) and Pope, see A. CRAIG, THE BANNED Booxs OF ENGLAND 26-32 (1962).
For an account of Rex v. Curl and its background, see D. THOMAS, supra note 23, at
78-84.
28 For example, in Cavalli's characteristically lascivious opera, La Calisto (ca. 1650),
Calisto's amorous approach to the goddess Diana is rejected with "Tad, lascia, tacil Qual,
qual delirio oscenol l'ingeno ti confonde?", meaning "Silence, lascivious girll/ What, what ob-
scene delirium/ has come over your reason?" Cavalli, La Calisto, act I, scene 1.
29 For a useful general account, see Alpert, supra note 23. For accounts of English
legal development, see D. THOMAS, supra note 23; N. ST. JOHN-STEVAs, OBSCENITY
AND THE LAW (1956). For the best general account of earlier American development,
see Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L.
REV. 295 (1954).
The case establishing the common law misdemeanor of obscene libel, Rex v. Curl,
93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B. 1727), involved two books, Venus in the Cloister and A Treatise of
the Use of Flogging in Venereal Affairs, and the Victorian censorship movement was directed
largely against pornographic literature. See text accompanying notes 47-51 infra. The
same is true of the Comstock movement in America.
The test for obscenity established in The Queen v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371
(1868) was "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a
publication of this sort is likely to fall," was originally applied to a work thought likely to
suggest "thoughts of a most impure and libidinous character." Id. The Hicklin test was
followed in America, see, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093 (No. 14,571)
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879); People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408 (1884), until abandoned in United
States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses", 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934), affig 5 F. Supp. 182
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ally corrupting.30 Many of these connections were summarized
in the language of the Comstock Act, which, in forbidding the
mailing of obscene material in interstate commerce, speaks of
"obscene, lewd, or lascivious . . . publication[s]" and included in
its prohibitions contraceptives and abortifacients or anything else
"for any indecent or immoral use." 31
The most significant class of speech acts involving the notion
of the obscene is that class of epithets, known as "obscenities,
' 32
which relate to excretory or sexual functions. Such expressions
are, at least in reasonably well-educated circles, conventionalized
ways of expressing attitudes of disgust and contempt which de-
pend for their sometimes shocking and bracing effect 33 on the
impropriety of their use. In circles, like the army, 34 where the
verbal obscenities are constantly employed, their function seems
quite different: there they are used not to signify extreme disgust
but, rather, as a kind of manly, transgression-braving vocabulary
whose use is a criterion of intimate membership in the group. Re-
lated to this is the use of obscenities among intimate friends and
even as a language of love.
The verbal obscenities demonstrate not only the relation of
the obscene to shock and offense, but to the anxiety-producing
loss of control. On hearing or using such expressions in reason-
ably well-educated circles, one has the sense of a loss of control,
(S.D.N.Y. 1933). The new test turned on whether the "dominant effect" was "libidinous"
72 F.2d at 708, 707.
For the current prurient interest test, established in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957), see note 58 infra.
3o See note 29 supra.31The text of the substantive section of the Comstock Act § 2, ch. 258, § 2, 17 Stat.
598, 599 (1873), as amended, 18 U.S.C. 1461 (1970) reads as follows:
[N]o obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, paper, print, or other
publication of an indecent character, or any article or thing designed or intended
for the prevention of conception or procuring of abortion, nor any article or
thing intended or adapted for any indecent or immoral use or nature, nor any
written or printed card, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement or notice of
any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or of whom,
or by what means either of the things before mentioned may be obtained or
made, nor any letter upon the envelope of which, or postal-card upon which
indecent or scurrilous epithets may be written or printed, shall be carried in the
mail ....
32 A useful study of these words is E. SAGARIN, THE ANATOMY OF DIRTY WORDS (1962).
See also Read, An Obscenity Symbol, 9 AM. SPEECH 264 (1934).
3' For an account of the force of such expressions in psychoanalysis, see S. FERENCZI,
SEX IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 132-53 (E. Jones transl. 1950); cf Stone, On the Principal Obscene
Word of the English Language, 35 INT'L J. PSYCHO-ANAL. 30 (1954).
3 4 
See, e.g., SONGS AND SLANG OF THE BRITISH SOLDIER: 1914-1918, at 15 (3d ed. Bro-
phy & Partridge eds. 1931).
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a sudden frustration, or an explosion of pique, which may sur-
prise the speaker as much as the listener.
In the light of these functions and marks of the verbal ob-
scenities, one can better understand the functions of literature
which employs obscene contents, for example, some works of
Swift35 and Pope.36 By employing contents known to be offensive
to the conventional proprieties, such literature can express com-
plex communicative intentions of bitter satire and burlesque 37 in
ways related to the capacity of the verbal obscenities to express
disgust and contempt. Similarly, one can understand the use of
the obscene in literary humor as well as in the smutty joke and
obscene witticism. 38 Obviously, such effects of the obscene are
in some important way tied to attitudes, the existence of which
accounts for these effects.
B. An Explication of the Obscene
The concept of the obscene is identical with the concept of
those actions, representations, works, or states which display an
exercise of bodily function, or such an exercise in certain cir-
cumstances, which constitutes an abuse of bodily function, as
dictated by standards in which one has invested self-esteem, so
that the supposed abuse of bodily function is an object of self-
contempt and -disgust.
On this view, the obscene is a subcategory of the objects of
shame. Shame is, I believe, properly understood in terms of a
fall from one's self-concept in the exercise of capacities which one
desires to exercise competently.39 The objects of shame, thus, are
explained by reference to the notions of personal competence
and self-respect which are their bases. One feels ashamed be-
cause, for example, he has been cowardly, failing to exercise
courageous self-control over fear when danger threatened. A
characteristic mark of such failure is self-contempt or -disgust.
The obscene identifies a special class of the possible objects
of shame which are explained by reference to certain defined
'5 See, e.g., J. SwiFT, A Tale of a Tub, in GULLIVER'S TRAVELS AND OTHER WRITINGS
245, 327-29, 334-36 (L. Landa ed. 1960); J. SwiFr, A Voyage to Lilliput, in id. 3, 34-35.
36 See A. POrE, supra note 27, at 299-300, 303-04, 306, 308-14.
37 For similar remarks, with special attention to pornography, see D. THOMAS, supra
note 23, at 273-74, 313-14 (1969). See also S. SONTAG, STYLES OF RADICAL WILL 35-73
(1969).
3 8 
Cf S. FREUD, Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF SIG-
MUND FREUD 631, 692-97 (A. Brill transl. & ed. 1938).
39 See D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 250-67.
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notions of personal competence in the exercise of bodily func-
tions. Thus, just as one explains to a child that it is an abuse and
misuse of the function of a knife or fork to put either in his ear,
so too one explains the proper exercise of bodily function. The
use of the body, like the use of knives and forks, is thought to
have precise and sharply defined functions and ends.40 This
mode of thought, discernible in a pervasive way in primitive peo-
ples and the most ancient cultures,4 ' including, significantly,
ancient Judaism, 42 rigidly defines certain dear proprieties of
bodily function as pure or dean. By contrast, failure to so exer-
cise bodily function is unclean, polluting, an abomination, in
short, obscene.
43
The obscene, thus, is a conceptual residuum of very ancient
ways of thinking about human conduct. Human beings are
thought of as clusters of strengths or virtues and corresponding
weaknesses or vices, where virtues and vices are not conceived
in narrow moral terms.44 Obscenity within this view is a kind of
vice, a wasting and abuse of the natural employment of bodily
functions. Hence, a culture's definition of the obscene will indi-
cate those areas of bodily function in which the culture centrally
invests its self-esteem and in which deviance provokes the deepest
anxieties. For example, incompetence with respect to excretory
function typically defines the frailest members of society, infants
and the senile. Where frailty and declining powers are a source
of anxiety, excretory impropriety is likely to be regarded as ob-
scene. Moreover, where the sexual function is regarded as akin
to the excretory function, as it easily may be,45 sexual behavior
will come to share with excretory behavior condemnation as ob-
scene.
Importantly, this explication of the obscene is intended to
apply cross-culturally. 46 To the extent people in different cul-
tures take different attitudes to certain bodily functions, those
cultures will take different views of those things that are ob-
scene, though the cultures both share the concept of the ob-
40 1 am grateful to Pat and Ann Parker for this observation.
41 See M. DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER 1966).
4 2 See id. 41-57.
41 See, e.g., Leviticus 11-15, 17-18.
44 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 116-251 (M. Ostwald transl. 1962).
45 See notes 79 & 80 infra & accompanying text.
46 For a similar attempt at cross-cultural definition of the obscene, see Honigman,
A Cultural Theory of Obscenity, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS
31 (M. DeMartino ed. 1963).
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scene as abuse of bodily function. This is true over time as well.
English society in the eighteenth century was apparently very
tolerant of obscene literature, despite the fact that obscene libel
had become a common law offense.47 But in the nineteenth cen-
tury, changing moral standards gave rise to groups like the
Society for the Suppression of Vice and prosecution for obscene
libel increased rapidly.48 Concern over the explosion of porno-
graphic literature49 finally received expression in the Customs
Consolidation Act of 185350 and Lord Campbell's Act of 1857. 51
A more striking example is provided by the Tahitians who do
not take the Western European or American view of the compe-
tent exercise of sexual function, but they do take a rather strin-
gent view of eating; thus for Tahitians, displays of coitus are
not obscene, but displays of eating are obscene. 52 For us, aside
from contexts of satirical humor,53 eating conventional food
would be obscene only in extreme circumstances of gluttonous
self-indulgence 54 or in circumstances where eating is associated
with aphrodisiacal allure.
55
Significantly, this explication provides and accounts for the
application of "obscene" to acts as well as depictions of acts. Both
acts and depictions areobscene if they display certain "unnatural"
exercises of bodily function; whether by the act itself or by depic-
tion, our anxiety is aroused when we become aware of phenom-
ena which assault our self-esteem. It does not follow, of course,
that obscene depictions are only of obscene acts. Normal hetero-
sexual intercourse between a married couple is not typically
4' Rex v. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B. 1727). See notes 27 & 29 supra.
4' See N. ST. JoHN-STEVAs, supra note 29, at 29-65; D. THOMAS, supra note 23, at
113-28, 179-290.
49 For a literary analysis of some notable examples of Victorian pornography, see
S. MARCUS, THE OTHER VICTORIANS (1966).
50 16 & 17 Vict., c.107 (repealed by Customs Consol. Act of 1876,39 & 40 Vict., c. 36,
§§ 42, 288).
51 20 & 21 Vict., c. 83 (repealed by Obscene Publications Act of 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2,
c. 66, § 3(8)). For a history of the passage of this statute, see N. ST. JOHN-STEvAS, supra
note 29, at 66-69; D. THOMAS, supra note 23, at 261-63.
5 25 See La Barre, Obscenity: An Anthropological Appraisal, 20 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB.
533, 541-42 (1955). Geoffrey Gorer cites the Trobriand Islanders as a people who finds
public eating of solid food an obscenity. G. GORER, supra note 19, at 218.
For a discussion of the Indian idea that eating may be polluting, see M. DOUGLAS,
supra note 41, at 33-34.
5' The suggestion of the reversal of the roles of eating and excretion (namely, that
eating would be obscene and excretion a social occasion) is the subject of one scene of
hilarious social satire in Bunuel's movie, Le Fant6me de la Libertg (1974). It is significant
that for us, unlike the Tahitians, this reversal is an object of deep laughter.
54 E.g., the movie La Grande Bouffe (1974).
55 E.g., the famous eating scene in the movie Tom Jones (1963).
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viewed as obscene; but a public depiction of such intercourse
would, by some people, be viewed as obscene. Nonetheless, there
is little question that the obscenity of an act is a sufficient condi-
tion for the obscenity of a depiction of that act. Most cases of ob-
scene depictions fall into this category. At one time obscenity con-
victions were granted for the mere sympathetic discussion of
homosexuality or advocacy of birth control or abortion, apart
from any pornographic representation of any kind.56 The idea
seems to have been that, homosexuality or birth control or abor-
tion being obscene, any favorable discussion of them was obscene.
Even today, it is clear that courts are quickest to make or affirm
judgments of obscenity with respect to depictions of sexual acts
such as cunnilingus, fellatio, sodomy, sadomasochism, and besti-
ality that are regarded as obscene in themselves.5 7 The view that
these acts are obscene is the basis for judging their depiction to
be obscene. This is, of course, wholly unsurprising because the
prurient interest criterion for the constitutionally obscene 58 es-
sentially comes to "an exacerbated, morbid, or perverted in-
terest,"59 that is, an interest which is itself regarded as abnormal
and obscene.
6
See H.M. HYDE, A HISTORY OF PORNOGRAPHY 3-8 (1964); N. ST. JOHN-STEVAS,
supra note 29, at 70-74, 98-103. See also note 31 supra; notes 139 & 140 infra.
57 Compare, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. SIaton, 413 U.S. 49, 52 (Burger, C.J., em-
phasized the occurrence of "scenes of simulated fellatio, cunnilingus, and group sex in-
tercourse") and Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1965) (depictions of flagellation,
fetishism, and lesbianism held obscene), with Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355
U.S. 372 (1958) (per curiam), rev'g 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957), aff'g 128 F. Supp. 564
(D.D.C. 1955) (nudity per se not obscene). Cf R. KUH, FOOUSH FIGLEAVES? 306-07 (1967)
(suggesting that pictured bestiality and homosexuality are more obscene than comparable
pictured heterosexuality).
11 In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Supreme Court held that ma-
terial was obscene if "the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
[would find that] the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest," id. at 489, meaning "a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion, [going] substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or repre-
sentation of such matters." Id. at 487 n.20 (quoting from MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2)
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957)).
The test was restated in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), so that the material had to be not
merely prurient, but "patently offensive because it affront[ed] contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters .... Id. at 418.
After Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), however, the test turns on "whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law," id. at 24, rather than on the more nebulous "contemporary
community standards."
In thus defining the obscene in terms of appeal to prurient interest, the Court has
expressly excluded from the obscene other contents, such as the portrayal of violence,
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (this holding questionable today because of a
growing usage applying the notion of the obscene to violence, on the analogy, in my view,
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The connection between the obscenity of acts and depictions
of acts distinguishes the obscene from the indecent. The distinc-
tive mark of the indecent is the public exhibition of that which,
while unobjectionable in private, is offensive and embarrassing
when done in public. 60 The obscene, by contrast, may be and of-
ten is condemned whether or not it involves a public display.
61
Finally, this linkage between the act and its depiction pro-
vides an account for the use of obscene contents in speech acts
expressing contempt and disgust. Since the obscene identifies a
disgusting abuse of bodily function, it is wholly natural that it
should be used to express disgust.6 2 It follows that, if one does
not find certain communicative contents obscene, one may ten-
dentiously advocate the abandonment of speech acts using those
contents to express disgust.
6 3
C. The Obscene and the Pornographic
Pornography etymologically derives from the Greek porno-
graphos, meaning "writing of harlots," literally, writing concern-
ing or descriptive of prostitutes in their profession.6 4 Thus, the
of an abuse of proper bodily function); sacrilege, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 504-06 (1952); and mere vulgarity, Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146
(1946). See also United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 163 (2d Cir. 1965). (A further distinc-
tion was drawn in United States v. Limehouse, 285 U.S. 424 (1932), between "filthy"
matter and "obscene" matter for the purposes of deciding the scope of legislation prohib-
iting the mailing of "obscene" and "filthy" matter.)
The Court has also made clear that the constitutional protection is afforded so-called
thematic or ideological obscenity-material that does not in itself arouse lustful thoughts,
though it might persuade the recipient to engage in obscene conduct. Kingsley Int'l Pic-
tures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). An illuminating commentary on Roth and
Kingsley Int'l Pictures appears in Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup.
CT. REV. 1. See also Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitu-
tional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5 (1960); Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The
Core Constitutional Issue-What Is Obscene?, 7 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1961).
59 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, Comment at 29 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
60 See Feinberg, "Harmless Immoralities" and Offensive Nuisances, in ISSUES IN LAW AND
MORALITY 83, 87 (N. Care & T. Trelogan eds. 1973).
61 The confusion of the obscene and the indecent is not uncommon. See, e.g., L.
STRACHEY, Will It Come Right in the End?, in THE REALLY INTERESTING QUESTION 71
(1974); Art and Indecency, in id. 82.
62 Expressed more formally, the view here proposed is that sentences of the form "x
is obscene" express true or false propositions about x's being an abuse of bodily function;
this propositional content in turn explains the ground for using such an expression in
various speech acts, including expressions of disgust. For a development of this kind of
analysis in extenso, see D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 49-62, 212-41.
63 This proposal has in fact been made with respect to sexual contents. See, e.g., E.
SAGARIN, supra note 32, at 9-12, 160-74. Lenny Bruce, according to the show The World
of Lenny Bruce, scene 1 (1974), predicted the day when, pursuant to his view of the non-
obscenity of sex, the erstwhile sexual obscenities would be used as forms of congratula-
tion and good wishes.64
See, e.g., WEBsTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1767 (1966).
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depictions of various forms of sexual intercourse on the walls of
a certain building in Pompeii, intended as aphrodisiacs for the
orgiastic bacchanales housed there,65 were literally pornographos.
Pornography in this sense is identified by its sexually explicit
content, its depiction of varied forms of sexual intercourse,
turgid genitalia, and so on.
66
Pornography is neither conceptually nor factually identical
with the obscene. Conceptually, the notion of sexually explicit,
aphrodisiacal depictions is not the same idea as that of the im-
proper abuse of a bodily function. Factually, many cultures,
though sharing in the fundamental concept of the obscene, do
not regard pornography as obscene.6 7 Individuals within our cul-
ture may find coprophagy (eating feces) obscene, 68 but do not
find pornography obscene, 69 because they fail to take a certain
attitude toward "proper" sexual function although they do have
ideas about "proper" excretory function. For such people, view-
ing sex or depictions of sex as obscene is an unfortunate confla-
tion of the sexual and the excrementitious.
7 0
e See H.M. HYDE, supra note 56, at 1, 10.
6 Morse Peckham suggests a procedural definition of pornography in terms of the
depiction of "human sexual organs in a condition of stimulation." M. PECKHAM, ART AND
PORNOGRAPHY 46-47 (1969). This definition is not implausible if one is seeking a kind of
bare minimum for the pornographic, for it is clear that a depiction of a person, completely
clothed except for exposure of the genitalia, would be regarded as pornographic.
See also A. KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 671-72 (1953); E. KRON-
HAUSEN & P. KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW 262, 265 (1959); Eliasberg, Psy-
chiatric Viewpoints on Indecency, Obscenity, and Pornography in Literature and the Arts, 16 AM.
J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 477-83 (1962); Eliasberg, Art: Immoral or Immortal, 45 J. CRIM. L.C.
& P.S. 274-78 (1954); Reed, Consensus and Dissensus in Pornography Definitions, 5 INT'L BE-
HAVIORAL SCIENTIST 1-12 (1973). The aphrodisiacal functions of pornography are shown
by the fact that popular sex manuals recommend it in certain circumstances. See, e.g., THE
JOY OF SEX 208-09 (A. Comfort ed. 1972).
67 
See H.M. HYDE, supra note 56, at 30-58; D. LOTH, THE EROTIC IN LITERATURE 41-68
(1961); M. PECKHAM, supra note 66, at 257-301; La Barre, supra note 52, at 533-35. See also
L. GICHNER, EROTIC ASPECTS OF CHINESE CULTURE (1957); L. GICHNER, EROTIC ASPECTS
OF JAPANESE CULTURE (1953); P. RAWSON, EROTIC ART OF THE EAST (1968).
" The example of coprophagy occurs in M. DE SADE, 120 Days of Sodom, in 2 THE
COMPLETE MARQUIS DE SADE 215, 222 (P. Gillette transl. 1966). De Sade provides other
similar examples, such as eating vomit, which someone might find obscene, even if he
would not find pornography obscene. Id. 215.
6
1 See R. HANEY, COMSTOCKERY IN AMERICA 58-9, 67-69, 75 (1960); D. LOTH, supra
note 67, at 208-33; L. MARCUSE, OBSCENE: THE HISTORY OF AN INDIGNATION 303-27 (K.
Gershon transl. 1965); M. PECKHAM, supra note 66, at 19-20, 46; B. RUSSELL, MARRIAGE
AND MORALS 93-117 (1929); E. SAGARIN, supra note 32, at 9-12, 160-74. Bu cf. Goodman,
Pornography, Art, and Censorship, in PERSPECTIVES ON PORNOGRAPHY 42 (D. Hughes ed.
1970); Sagarin, On Obscenity and Pornography, in THE NEW SEXUAL REVOLUTION 105 (L.
Kirkendall & R. Whitehurst 1971).
7' See H. ELLIS, supra note 19, at 21-37; E. KRONHAUSEN & P. KRONHAUSEN, supra note
66, at 167; B. RUSSELL, supra note 69; at 106-07.
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If there is no necessary connection between the pornographic
and the obscene, how did the connection between them arise?
One account of the sexual morality behind this connection
is that of Catholic canon law which
holds, as a basic and cardinal fact, that complete sexual
activity and pleasure is licit and moral only in a naturally
completed act in valid marriage. All acts which, of their
psychological and physical nature, are designed to be
preparatory to the complete act, take their licitness and
their morality from the complete act. If, therefore, they
are entirely divorced from the complete act, they are
distorted, warped, meaningless, and hence immoral.
7'
This view of course derives from St. Augustine's classic con-
ception that the only proper "genital commotion"7 2 is one with
the voluntary aim of reproduction of the species. 73 It follows
from this view that only certain rigidly defined kinds of "natural"
intercourse in conventional marriage are moral; "unnatural"
forms of such intercourse are forbidden; extramarital and of
course homosexual intercourse is forbidden. Further, all material
that will induce to "genital commotion" not within marriage is for-
bidden. Pornography is obscene not only in itself, because it dis-
plays intercourse not within marriage, but also because it tempts
to intercourse outside marriage or to masturbation, which are
independently obscene acts because they are forms of sexual
conduct that violate minimum standards of proper bodily func-
tion and thus cause disgust.
While this specific Catholic view is not the universal basis for
the connection of the obscene and the pornographic, this general
kind of view seems always present. Sexual function of certain rig-
idly defined kinds is alone the correct and competent exercise
of sexual function. All other forms are marked by failure, weak-
71 Gardiner, Moral Principles Toward a Definition of the Obscene, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 560, 564 (1955); cf. T.L. BOUSCAREN, A. ELUS & F. KORTH, CANON LAW 711-33
(1946). For similar statements of the Catholic view, see H. GARDINER, CATHOLIC VIEW-
POINT ON CENSORSHIP 62-67 (1958); T. MURPHY, CENSORSHIP: GOVERNMENT AND OSCEN-
ITY 34-36 (1963). For a critique, see R. HANEY, supra note 69, at 88-96.
72 This quaint phrase appears in GARDINER, supra note 71, at 567.
73 See, AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 470-72 (M. Dods transl. 1950). St. Thomas
Aquinas is in accord with Augustine's view. Of the emission of semen apart from gen-
eration in marriage, he wrote, "after the sin of homicide whereby a human nature already
in existence is destroyed, this type of sin appears to take next place, for by it the generation
of human nature is precluded." T. AQUINAS, ON THE TRUTH OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH:
SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES 146 (V. Bourke transl. 1946). But cf. W. MASTERS & V. JOHNSON,
HUMAN SEXUAL INADEQUACY 198-99 (1970) (insisting that sexuality cannot be willed).
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ness, and disgust. Masturbation in particular is a moral wrong.74
Clearly this general notion, premised on supposed medical
as well as theological facts, was behind the extraordinary explo-
sion in obscenity legislation in England and the United States in
the 1850's, 1860's, and 1870's. 75 In particular, this legislation
rested squarely on the remarkable Victorian medical view re-
lating masturbation and sexual excess in general to insanity.
76
Pornography, being in part masturbation fantasy, 77 was con-
demned on medical as well as theological grounds, so that An-
thony Comstock, the father of the Comstock Act, could point
with the support of medical authority to the fact that pornog-
graphy's "most deadly effects are felt by the victims in the habit
of secret vices....
Significantly, Victorian medical literature and pornogra-
phy79 make transparent that sexual function was construed on
the model of excretory function.80 The proper exercise of sexual
function was rigidly defined in terms of one mode, marital re-
74 Accordingly, statutes have made it a crime to allure minors to commit masturba-
tion. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4221 (Supp. 1974).
75 Prior to that time, obscenity had only reluctantly been accepted into the common
law. See sources collected at note 29 supra. Indeed, originally, obscenity had been regarded
as objectionable only in connection with blasphemy and thus best left to the ecclesiastical
courts. The Queen v. Reed, 92 Eng. Rep. 777 (K.B. 1708). Thus, the Catholic Church
had allowed the Decameron to be published, leaving in the sexually explicit material but
changing the nuns and priests involved to other kinds of persons. See N. ST. JOHN-
STEVAS, supra note 29, at 4-5. See also St. John-Stevas, The Church and Censorship, in
To DEPRAVE AND CoRRUPT, supra note 18, at 89.
76 See A. COMFORT, THE ANXIETY MAKERS (1970); J. HALLER & R. HALLER, THE
PHYSICIAN AND SEXUALITY IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 191-234 (1974); S. MARCUS, supra
note 49; Hare, Masturbational Insanity: The History of an Idea, 108 J. MENTAL SCIENCE 1,
6-9 (1962). Thus, one standard Victorian work on sexual function observes that, as a
consequence of masturbation, a boy becomes "sluggish and enfeebled, and if his evil
habits are persisted in, he may end in becoming a drivelling idiot or peevish valetu-
dinarian", excerpt quoted in S. MARCUS, supra note 49, at 19; cf. excerpt quoted in A.
COMFORT, supra 107-08.
77 Cf Allen, supra note 19, at 144.
78 A. COMSTOCK, TRAPS FOR THE YOUNG 136 (R. Bremner ed. 1967). See also id. 132-33,
139, 145, 169, 179, 205; A. COMSTOCK, FRAUDS EXPOSED 388-389, 416, 437-38, 440-41
(1880, reprinted 1969).
" See, e.g., S. MARCUS, supra note 49, at 24-25, 233, 243.
80 See H. ELLIS, supra note 19, at 21-25. In this connection, Masters and Johnson ob-
serve:
Seemingly, many cultures and certainly many religions have risen and fallen on
their interpretation or misinterpretation of one basic physiological fact. Sexual
functioning is a natural physiological process, yet it has a unique facility that
no other natural physiological process, such as respiratory, bladder, or bowel
function, can imitate. Sexual responsivity can be delayed indefinitely or functionally
denied for a lifetime. No other basic physiological process can claim such malle-
ability of physical expression.
W. MASTERS & V. JOHNSON, supra note 73, at 10.
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productive sexuality. Within that mode, the proper function was
one of regularity and moderation. Thus, doctors condemned
sexual excess within marriage 8' and deprecated infertile sexual
activity within marriage as "conjugal onanism. '8 2 This rigid and
narrow conception of sexual function was obviously profoundly
opposed to pornography which would expose, in the words of
one prominent Victorian court, "the minds of those hitherto pure
... to the danger of contamination and pollution from the im-
purity it contains. ' 3
Similar views regarding the evils of masturbation are echoed
in contemporary writers who condemn pornography. Thus, D.
H. Lawrence emphasized the corrosive effects of autoeroticism
on the capacity for the central spiritual experience, for Lawrence,
of sexual mutuality between partners.
8 4
Whatever the form of theological, medical, or psychological
belief underlying the association of the obscene and the porno-
graphic, some such belief always obtains, so that there is a signif-
icant correlation between judgments of obscenity and the judg-
ments that a certain work is both sexually arousing and quite
unpleasant.
8 5
II. THE MORAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Having attempted to clarify the notion of the obscene which
underlies obscenity law, we must now elaborate the suggestion
that a certain developing contractarian moral theory may sig-
nificantly clarify the moral basis and proper interpretation of the
first amendment. First, we will focus on the moral principles
centrally relevant to this problem, namely, the principles of jus-
tice. Then, we will be able to apply these principles to the moral
analysis of the constitutional interpretation of the first amend-
ment.
A. The Principles of Justice
An adequate moral theory would express the intuitive fea-
tures of the common sense notion of morality, organizing these
81 A. COMFORT, supra note 76, at 57.
82Id. 155, 161.
83 The Queen v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 359, 372 (1868).
'4 See D.H. LAWRENCE, SEX, LITERATURE, AND CENSORSHIP 64-81 (1953). For similar
sentiments see Mead, Sexand Censorship in Contemporary Society, in NEW WORLD WRITING,
7, 19-21 (1953).
"5See UNITED STATES COMM'N ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, REPORT OF THE
COMM'N ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 210-12 (GPO ed. 1970) [hereinafter REPORT];
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
features in a constructive and determinate way. The central in-
tuitive features of morality are mutual respect 6-treating others
as you would like to be treated in comparable circumstances; uni-
versalization 87-judging the morality of principles by the conse-
quences of their universal application; and minimization of
fortuitous human differences, like clan, caste, ethnicity, and color,
as a basis for differential treatment.88
This Article employs a contractarian analysis, following the
model of John Rawls, 8 9 that incorporates the intuitive features
of morality in this way: Moral principles are those that perfectly
rational men, irrespective of historical or personal age, in a hypo-
thetical position of equal liberty and having all knowledge and
reasonable belief except that of their specific personal situation,
would agree to as the ultimate standards of conduct that are appli-
cable at large. Mutual respect is inherent in the idea of moral
principles as standards to which all men would consent, defining
the ways in which they, as well as others, should be treated in com-
parable circumstances. Universalization is expressed by the idea
that the morality of any principle is to be judged on the assump-
tion that it is generally accepted and acted on. The minimization
of fortuity is guaranteed by the ignorance of specific identity.
Our concern is to apply this definition of moral principles
to a theory of justice, so we must introduce into the original posi-
tion the existence of conflicting claims over a limited supply of
"general goods" and consider a specific set of principles to regu-
late claims on such goods. If there were general goods in abun-
dant superfluity, or if people were more willing to sacrifice their
interests for the good of others, the need for principles of justice
might be nonexistent or significantly different.90
cf. Higgins & Katzman, Determinants in the Judgment of Obscenity, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 1733
(1969).
6 See K. BAIER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW 187-213 (1958); D. GAUTHIER, PRACTICAL
REASONING 81-94 (1963); G. GRICE, THE GROUNDS OF MORALJUDGMENT (1967); J. RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 130-32 (1971); D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 75-91.87 See R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 92-94 (1963); D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note
15, at 83-85, 216.
88 This idea is the basis of Kant's theory of autonomy. See I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 65-71 (L. Beck transl. 1959). Cf. J.S. Mill's remark that the
true idea of distributive justice consists in "redressing the inequalities and wrongs of na-
ture." J.S. MILL, 2 PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 398 (1864). Mill thus concludes
that primogeniture is unjust in that distinctions are grounded on accident. Id. 505. Cf.
Sidgwick's claim that justice rewards voluntary effort not natural ability alone. H. SIDG-
WICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 505-06, 531 (1887).
89J. RAWLS, supra note 86; D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 75-91.
90 For David Hume's remarkable discussion of the conditions of moderate scarcity,
see D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 485, 495 (1888).
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"General goods" are those things or conditions that are typi-
cally the objects of rational choices or desires as the generalized
means to a variety of particular desires.9 It is natural to classify
liberty as one of these general goods. Liberty forA to do X implies
the absence of constraint, either to do or not to do X; obviously,
the existence of various rights and liberties is an important gen-
eralized means enabling each person to pursue his particular
ends, whatever they may be. Liberties of thought and expres-
sion (freedom of speech, the press, religion, and association),
civic rights (impartial administration of civil and criminal law in
defense of property and person), political rights (the right to
vote and participate in political constitutions), and freedom of
physical, economic, and social movement are fundamental in
this respect. Similarly, it is natural to identify opportunity,
92
capacity, property, and wealth as basic distributive goods.
The original position presents a problem of rational choice
under uncertainty: rational men in the original position have no
way of predicting the probabilities that they may end up in any
given situation of life. If a person agrees to principles of justice
that permit deprivations of liberty and property rights and later
discovers that he occupies a disadvantaged position, he will have
no just claim against deprivations which may render his entire
life prospects meager and bitterly servile. To forestall such con-
sequences, the rational strategy in choosing the basic principles
of justice would be the conservative "maximin" strategy: 93 make
certain that the worst position in the system adopted is the best
of all conceivable worst positions, that is, maximize the minimum
condition. Thus, if a person is born into the worst possible situa-
tion of life allowed by the adopted moral principles, he or she
will still be better off than in the worst situatiorr allowed by any
other possible principles.
The application of the maximin strategy requires us to con-
sider the interpretation and relative weight assigned the general
goods by those in the original position. These dimensions will
crucially determine the principles governing the distribution of
general goods.
Consider, for example, the liberties of thought and expres-
91 The notion of rationality considered here is developed in D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra
note 15, at 27-48, 63-71. See also C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 87-101 (1970); J.
RAWLS, supra note 86, at 407-16. The general view of the good is discussed in id. 395-
452; D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 286-91.
92 See Richards, supra note 2, at 41-49.
" See J. RAWLS, supra note 86, at 150-6 1.
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sion, in speech, the press, religion or association. The idea here
is that people are not to be constrained to communicate or not
to communicate, to believe or not to believe, to associate or not
to associate. The value placed on this cluster of ideas derives from
the notion of self-respect 94 that comes from a mature person's
full and untrammelled exercise of capacities central to human
rationality.9" Thus, the significance of free expression rests on
the central human capacity to create and express symbolic sys-
tems, such as speech, writing, pictures, and music, intended to
communicate in determinate, complex and subtle ways. Freedom
of expression permits and encourages the exercise of these ca-
pacities: it supports a mature individual's sovereign autonomy
in deciding how to communicate with others; it disfavors restric-
tions on communication imposed for the sake of the distorting
rigidities of the orthodox and the established. In so doing, it
nurtures and sustains the self-respect of the mature person.
Further, freedom of expression protects the interest of the
mature individual, with developed capacities of rational choice,
in deciding whether to be an audience to a communication and in
weighing the communication according to his own rational vision
of life.96 This idea was expressed by Kant by the moving thought
that each rational being is a sovereign legislator in the realm of
ends.97 It is a contempt of human rationality for any other puta-
tive sovereign, democratic or otherwise, to decide to what com-
munications mature people can be exposed.
The value of free expression, in this view, rests on its deep
relation to self-respect arising from autonomous self-determina-
tion without which the life of the spirit is meager and slavish. 98
Other arguments for the moral value of free expression, for ex-
ample, its relation to the discovery of truth,99 seem, by contrast,
less powerful and often unhappily overused when they will not
bear the fundamental weight they are expected to support 00
94 Self-respect has its natural basis in our desire to exercise our capacities competently.
See D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 257, 267-68.
95 See note 91 supra. See also J. BENNETT, RATIONALITY (1964).
96 Cf. Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, I PHILOs. & PUB. AFFAIRS 204 (1972).
97 See, e.g., I. KANT, supra note 88 at 50 et seq.
98 Cf J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 67-90 (C. Shields ed. 1956). See also C. BAY, THE STRUC-
TURE OF FREEDOM 65-152 (1965).
99 Curiously, Mill emphasizes these arguments when he discusses the moral basis
for freedom of thought and discussion, J.S. MILL, supra note 98, at 19-67, yet, stronger
arguments are mustered when he discusses individuality, id. 67-90. Cf C. REMBAR, THE
END OF OBSCENITY 12-13 (1968).
100 It is difficult to see why a general system of equal liberty is necessarily the best
system to advance the cause of truth. On this ground alone, it would seem that a better
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Such arguments, to the extent they are valid, at best provide ad-
ditional reasons to value freedom of communication. The value
of free expression is, however, as strong as its best moral argu-
ment, which is more potent than many another political banality
now used in its defense.'
0 '
One can clarify the nature and weight of other liberties in
similar ways. Voting rights importantly confirm a person's sense
of autonomous self-direction, without which the spirit shrivels
into apathy. Access to the criminal and civil law affords basic se-
curity of the person. The liberty of physical, social, and economic
movement frees a person from the fortuitous place and class of
his birth, thereby granting effort and aspiration open horizons.
In short, all these liberties, like the liberties of expression, nurture
a basic sense of self-respect, a belief in the competent inde-
pendence and integrity of one's person.
Similarly, basic opportunities are important preconditions
to the realization of the full value of equal liberties. Voting is
often a plebiscitary sham in a society whose population, lacking
educational opportunity, is largely illiterate. Without the training
that forms an independent intellectual conscience, freedom of
thought may be an ingredient of ochlocracy. Legal freedom of
social and economic movement is without value if institutions do
not provide the training that makes such movement possible in
fact.
Because such liberties and basic opportunities are among
the fundamental factors that shape a person's capacity to become
a full rational being and to enjoy the life of such a being, the ra-
tional contractors of the model of political morality could not,
consistently with the maximin strategy of rational choice, agree
to any configuration of principles except the one providing equal-
ity in the distribution of each of these general goods. The maxi-
min strategy calls for institutions that afford the most disadvan-
taged people a higher rational expectation of desire satisfaction
than any alternative system would afford them. Use of the maxi-
min strategy in choosing principles relating to liberty and basic
system would be to limit equal liberty to very narrow technocratically defined groups.
Further, the fact that a person chooses to believe and espouse views widely known to be
absurdly false does not diminish his moral right to express those views, notwithstanding
that he thereby advances falsity. This shows not that free expression is not worth defend-
ing, but that the value of free expression stands on grounds independent of the argument
of advancing truth.
101 Cf. J. RAWLs, supra note 86, at 209-11.
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opportunity, then, tends to eliminate the disadvantaged class; the
highest lowest condition is equality for all persons.
By contrast, once a certain minimum level of property and
income is guaranteed, the rational interest in property and in-
come is not as fundamental as that in liberty and basic opportu-
nity. 10 2 Assuming the greatest amount of equal liberty and basic
opportunity for all,' 0 3 inequalities in property and income above
the minimum are tolerable if there are countervailing advantages.
A relatively poor person, with full liberty and basic opportunity,
may be better off in a system that allows inequalities in the distri-
bution of wealth than in a system that requires equality: the con-
sequences of inequality, for example, incentive effects on total
production, may increase his absolute well-being although his
relative share is less than it would be in a system with mandated
equality of wealth.
The following principles of justice regulating the distributive
shares of general goods would therefore be accepted in the origi-
nal position: 04
The principle of equal liberty and basic opportunity. Basic in-
stitutions are to be arranged so that every person in the
institution is guaranteed the greatest equal liberty and
basic opportunity compatible with a like liberty and basic
opportunity for all.
The principle of justified inequality. Inequalities in the dis-
tribution by institutions of general goods like money,
property, and status are to be allowed only if those in-
equalities are a necessary incentive to elicit the exercise
of superior capacities, and only if the exercise of those
capacities advances the interests of typical people in all
standard classes in the institution more than equality
would advance those interests and makes the life expec-
tation of desire satisfaction of the typical person in the
least advantaged class as high as possible.
In considering the derivation of these principles from the
formal model, it is illuminating to bear in mind the special impor-
tance of the formal assumption of the contractors' ignorance of
102 1 put aside for present purposes the question of capacity distribution. For a dis-
cussion of this point, see D.A.J. RiCHARDS, supra note 15, at 135-38.
103 Including the liberty and opportunity to hold and dispose of personal property.
Obviously, this does not prejudge the morality of the private or public ownership of the
basic means of production.
104 This formulation is based on D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 121. For Rawls'
formulation, see J. RAWLS, supra note 86, at 302-03.
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their particular desires, nature, and circumstances. Thus, the
derivation of free expression is made possible by the contractors'
ignorance of their specific beliefs and tastes. Consequently, there
can be no appeals to special religious duties to a Catholic or Mus-
lim or Jewish God that override the equal liberty of religious be-
lief; nor can there be appeals to any taste or distaste for certain
kinds of literature in order to override the equal liberty of free
speech and press. Not knowing which, if any, is their religion or
taste in literature, the contractors' reasoning in the original posi-
tion will be based on ordinary principles of empirical inference
and the knowledge which such principles yield, not on special
kinds of principles and knowledge which religious faith or taste
may involve. 10 5 It follows, of course, that moral arguments, qua
moral, regarding the proper application of the principle of equal
liberty must rest on general empirical views; arguments based
on special perceptions that would not be admissible in the original
position must be decisively rejected.
In applying the equal liberty principle, the basic liberties
must be assessed as an interrelated system. The weights of each
kind of liberty may depend on the specification of other kinds
of liberty.' 0 6 With respect to the liberties of expression, we have
observed that these liberties constitute both a right to communi-
cate and a right to be the object of communication. Obviously,
these liberties must be adjusted to one another in such a way as
to best realize the underlying values of autonomous self-determi-
nation. The morally preferable adjustment is a liberty to com-
municate to any audience that is itself at liberty to choose to be
or not to be an audience. Given this interpretation, the liberty to
communicate, and other liberties are to be assessed as a whole in
the light of the principle requiring the greatest equal liberty com-
patible with a like liberty for all.
B. Justice and the First Amendment
Having formulated the relation between the principles of
justice and the allocation of general goods, we must now apply
the formulation to clarify the proper constitutional standards for
legislation bearing on the distribution of these goods. This is part
of the general problem of just constitutional design. The rational
contractors in the original position would, of course, know the
general characteristics of their land: its resources and stage of
105 See D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 123.
1o6 Cf J. RAwLs, supra note 86, at 203.
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economic growth, the extent of literacy, and other relevant condi-
tions. They would not know their own identity, however. On the
basis of such facts and within the constraints established by the
principles ofjustice, the rational contractors must agree on a gen-
eral constitutional framework.
It is unlikely that there is a unique solution to the problem
of just constitutional design; rather, any one of a range of con-
stitutions, involving different institutional frameworks, might be
adopted. A constitution providing that certain fundamental civil
and human rights are to remain intact, notwithstanding the
wishes of legislative majorities or popular leaders is certainly co-
herent with the idea of minimal principles of justice suggested
above. Indeed, as suggested earlier, 10 7 it is historically plausible
that the first amendment is an early expression of a developing
contractarian theory of justice. The moral foundation of consti-
tutional democracy is not majority rule, but the principles of jus-
tice. Majority rule is only justified to the extent that it coheres with
the principles of justice.' 0 8 Thus, the utilitarian political calcula-
tions of majority rule are limited by substantive benchmarks of
justice; there are points beyond which the interests of the few may
not be sacrificed to advance interests of the many.10 9 Whatever
its historic origins, the spirit and explicit content of the first
amendment is, of course, at one with contractarian moral theory:
freedom of speech, and of the press, and religious liberty are not
to be abridged, popular wishes to the contrary notwithstanding.1 1 0
In interpreting and enforcing the first amendment, courts
must determine, as a matter of progressively unfolding constitu-
tional interpretation, the proper standards under which their
responsibility is to be discharged. On the basis of our formula-
tion of applicable principles of justice the constitutional notions
of free speech and free press should be understood in terms of
107 See text accompanying notes 6-14, supra.
108 It follows that criticisms of constitutional adjudication, premissed on its frus-
tration of majority rule, rest on a superficial analysis of the moral principles under-
lying constitutional democracy. For notable examples of such criticisms, see Thayer,
The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129
(1893); L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1968).
109 Cf D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 87.
110 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. J.S. Mill stated the underlying moral point
dramatically when he wrote: "If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind
would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power,
would be justified in silencing mankind." J.S. MILL, supra note 98, at 21.
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the relevant requirements of the first principle of justice, namely,
the greatest equal liberty of communication compatible with a
like liberty for all. Thus, all legal prohibitions and regulations
which constrain liberty of communication in a manner incompati-
ble with this idea should be constitutionally forbidden and invalid.
The institutions and practices of free expression must be
assessed as a system"' with a view to ascertaining whether they
violate or cohere with the idea of a system of greatest equal liberty
compatible with a like liberty for all. For example, it is clear that
procedural rules of order, time, and place which regulate a rea-
sonable pattern of communications, cohere with this idea, for they
enlarge the equal liberty of communication compatible with a
like liberty for all."' Without such rules of order, time, and place,
the liberty of communication of one will be used to violate the
liberty of communication of another so that the system of liberties
is not the greatest equal liberty compatible with a like liberty for
all.
Similarly, the punishment of communications that are an
indispensable part of actions concretely designed and imminently
and realistically capable of effectuating the overthrow of the
constitutional order-for example, communicating military
secrets to the enemy-does not violate this equal liberty of com-
munications, for such communications would help to overthrow
the system of equal liberties. The proof that such communications
do advance the overthrow of the constitutional order must, how-
ever, appeal to general principles of empirical induction and in-
ference. No special principles of inference, not admissible in
deciding on the principles of justice, are admissible in the inter-
pretation of those principles." 3 Thus, special a priori views re-
garding the relation of certain communications to the decline
and fall of the constitutional order, not justified on generally
acceptable empirical grounds, are not morally tolerable as rea-
sons for limiting such communications."
4
"I I take the notion of a system of free expression from T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
1'2 See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 21-28 (1960).
' See note 105 & accompanying text supra. Cf. J. RAWLS, supra note 86, at 211-21.
114 Milton would not permit free speech for "Popery and open superstition which
as it extirpats all religion and civill supremacies, so it self should be extirpat ..... "
J. MILTON, supra note 7, at 330. Locke excepted atheists and Catholics from his principles
of toleration. LETTERS CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 8, at 45-47. Both Milton and
Locke, who thought that the beliefs of atheists and Catholics would destroy the civil order,
refused to extend liberty of speech and thought to them. In their view, morality rested on
religion, and therefore atheists were incapable of moral conduct which underlay the stable
civil order. Roman Catholics were committed to a foreign political order dedicated to the
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Attempts by the state to prohibit certain contents of com-
munication per se are fundamentally incompatible with the moral
and constitutional principle of equal liberty. Notwithstanding the
detestation of and outrage felt by the majority toward certain
contents of communication, the equal liberty principle absolutely
forbids the prohibition of such communications on the ground
of such detestation and outrage alone. Otherwise, the liberty of
expression, instead of the vigorous and potent defense of indi-
vidual autonomy that it is, would be a pitifully meager permis-
sion allowing people to communicate only in ways to which no
one has any serious objection. The interest of the few in free ex-
pression is not to be sacrificed on such grounds to the interest of
the many, notwithstanding utilitarian calculations to the contrary.
Conventional attitudes are not to be the procrustean measure of
the exercise of human expressive and judgmental competence.
On this view, the constitutionally protected liberty of free
expression is the legal embodiment of a moral principle which
ensures to each person the maximum equal liberty of communi-
cation compatible with a like liberty for all. Importantly, if the
first amendment freedoms rest on a fundamental moral prin-
ciple, they have no necessary justificatory relation to the liberty
of equal voting rights. No doubt, the existence of equal voting
rights advances values of self-direction and autonomy that are
also advanced by the liberties of expression and thought. But a
maximum equal liberty of self-expression is neither a necessary
nor a sufficient logical or factual condition of democratic voting
rights or of the competent exercise of those rights. Voting rights
may exist and be competently exercised in a regime where ex-
pression is not in general free, but is limited to a small class of
talented technicians who circulate relevant data on policy issues
to the electorate. Similarly, free expression may exist in a political
aristocracy or in a democracy where voting rights are not com-
petently exercised because of illiteracy or political apathy.
The independent status of the value of free expression from
the value of voting rights shows not that free expression is not
valuable, but that its value is not intrinsically political. It rests,
rather, on deeper moral premises regarding the general exercise
of autonomous expressive and judgmental capacity and the good
that this affords in human life. It follows that the attempt to limit
overthrow of the existing order; therefore, tolerance of their views would cause the in-
stability and breakdown of that order. Were these beliefs demonstrably false, as they are,
presumably Milton and Locke would extend equal liberty to these groups.
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the constitutional protection of free expression to the political" 15
must be rejected on moral and constitutional grounds."
6
Obviously, moral ideas do not coincide exactly with the first
amendment. Thus, the first amendment incorporates a state
action requirement. There is no moral reason why the Constitu-
tion should limit the moral right of free expression to abridge-
ments by the state when it is equally immoral for private persons
to abridge this right," 7 but we must accept as a fact that law and
morality do not coincide even in the first amendment.
Nonetheless, it is clear that strong moral ideas are implicit
in the first amendment and that moral analysis may clarify the
proper constitutional interpretation and application of those
ideas. It is significant in this connection that the account here pro-
posed clarifies many concrete features of first amendment ad-
judications," 8 for example, the propriety of reasonable regula-
tions of time, place, and procedure,"19 the insistence that majority
dislike of protected expression has no constitutional weight,
120
the basis of the clear and present danger test,' 2 1 and the refusal
115 See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 112. Meiklejohn has attempted to defend his view
by interpreting the political quite broadly. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Abso-
lute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 255-57, 262-63. For a similar view without any such attempt,
see Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-35 (1971).
Such a view derives its moral plausibility and appeal from an ambiguity in the notion of
being self-governing. It associates free expression with the general notion of personal
autonomy and then conflates this notion with the idea of voting rights. Once the am-
biguity is revealed, the view loses its appeal.
I 6 See Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 896-98 (1949).
117 There has, of course, been a significant line of cases which has enlarged the
concept of state action, but the state action requirement remains intact. See, e.g., Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (no entitlement to exercise first amendment
rights in a privately owned and operated shopping center merely because the public
is generally invited to do business there); cf. Moose Lodge 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972) (regulation by a state liquor board not sufficient to make practices of a private
club state action).
11 As an explication, this account seems to have more explanatory power than other
comparable general theories of the first amendment. Unlike Meiklejohn's theory, it ac-
counts for the fact that free expression is not limited to politics. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra
note 112; see note 115 supra & accompanying text. It also accounts for the clear and present
danger test, unlike the work of Thomas Emerson. See T. EMERSON, supra note 111; T.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966).
119 See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965); Poulos v. New Hampshire,
345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558 (1948); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-76 (1941).
120 See, e.g., A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 427 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring); Kingsley Interna-
tional Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1949).
121 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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to limit the first amendment to the political. 122 It is equally clear
that this account provides a framework from which the case law
may be critically assessed both as regards proper extensions of
first amendment rights, such as rights of access to the media,
123
and the criticism of anomalies in existing case law which depart
from its deepest moral strains.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OBSCENITY LAW
It should now be possible to apply the foregoing explication
of the obscene and the moral analysis of the first amendment to
the issue raised in Miller v. California1 24 and Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton125-the constitutionally permissible concept of the ob-
scene.
Miller reaffirmed the holding of Roth v. United States'2 6 that
obscene expression is not protected by the first amendment. In
addition, the Court, speaking through the Chief Justice, formu-
lated a constitutional test for obscenity. The test is threefold:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest ... ; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently of-
fensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value.127
This test imposes on states that wish to ban obscenity an obli-
gation to formulate specific standards. Moreover, Miller limits
the obscene to "representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual
acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated" or "of masturba-
tion, excretory functions and lewd exhibition of the genitals."'
128
122 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (all ideas with the slightest
redeeming social value have first amendment protection); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952).
123 This right has not yet been examined from the point of view afforded by contrac-
tarian moral theory. For a discussion of the right, see Barron, Access to the Press-A New
First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967).
124 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
125 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
126 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
127 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489).
128 Id. at 25. The force of these requirements was made clear in Jenkins v. Georgia,
94 S. Ct. 2750 (1974), where the court overruled an obscenity conviction involving the
movie Carnal Knowledge on the ground that the depictions were not sexually explicit within
the meaning of the applicable Miller tests.
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In effect, only hard-core scatology and pornography may be
banned.
1 29
On the other hand, the Miller test permits censorship wher-
ever the allegedly obscene work is without "serious" value. 130
Thus, a lighter burden is imposed on the prosecution than was
imposed under the prior "utterly without redeeming social value"
test. 13' Moreover, reliance on local standards, 32 within the
bounds of the court's test, permits a variety of constitutionally
permissible restrictions. Hence, a person's first amendment rights
may be restricted in one jurisdiction without appeal to a national
standard.' 33
The facts of Miller involved a conviction for mailing unso-
licited sexually explicit material which is, of course, a problem
of nonconsensual intrusion of offensive material. In Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton,134 however, a majority of the Court, again
speaking through Chief Justice Burger, applied the Miller cri-
teria for obscenity to an adult's fully informed and consensual
access to obscene materials. The Court thus narrowly limited the
holding of Stanley v. Georgia135 to its facts. There the Court in-
validated a state statute prohibiting the possession and private
use in one's home of obscene (pornographic) materials on the
grounds of infringing the constitutional right of privacy. In Paris
Adult Theatre, and other cases decided concurrently, the Court
made clear that the constitutional right of privacy as regards the
use of obscene materials applies only to one's home, not to any
129 413 U.S. at 27-28. Thus, the Court accepts the view previously expressed by Justice
Stewart. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,499 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Jaco-
bellis v. Ohio, 373 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Significantly, Justice
Stewart dissents in Miller and Paris Adult Theatre, joining in the dissent ofJustice Brennan.
413 U.S. at 73. The view that the constitutionally obscene should be limited to hard core
materials had previously been urged by various commentators. E.g., Kalven, supra note 58,
at 13; Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards,
45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 58-68 (1960).
130 413 U.S. at 24-25.
131 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massa-
chusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966).
132 413 U.S. at 30-34. No suggestion is made that the value test would be applied rel-
ative to local community standards. Such a suggestion would be absurd. The literary
and dramatic value, for example, of Shakespeare is not affected by the disvaluation of his
work by some parochial community. In Hamling v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 2887 (1974),
the Court made clear that the relevant community standards were not necessarily state-
wide.
133 The Court thus rejected the previously urged view that standards to be applied
were national, not local. E.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964) (Brennan,
J., opinion accompanying announcement of judgment of the Court).
134 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
135 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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theatre, nor even to the transport of such materials in one's trav-
eling bags for private use.
136
Miller and Paris Adult Theatre, then, find obscenity, even for
consenting adults, to be outside the protection of the first amend-
ment, but the analysis of this Article suggests that the Court's de-
cisions are wrong. An understanding of the moral function of the
first amendment compels a conclusion contrary to the Court's;
there should be a presumption that obscenity, like other forms of
expression, falls within the protection of the first amendment.
To summarize, obscene communications, it has been pro-
posed, implicate the improper abuse of basic bodily functions,
the proper exercise of which is an object of basic self-esteem, and
the improper abuse of which is an object of shame and disgust.
A sufficient, though not a necessary, condition of the obscenity
of a communication is that the act depicted be obscene.
On this view, the precise application of the notion of the ob-
scene crucially depends on beliefs and attitudes involving precise
and rigid definitions of the proper exercise of bodily functions.
Thus, different cultures, with different beliefs and attitudes, may
regard dissimilar acts or objects as obscene. Similarly, within a
culture, individuals having discrepant beliefs and attitudes about
proper bodily function may apply the label "obscene" to different
phenomena. In the United States, for example, there are many
people who, having certain attitudes toward proper sexual func-
tion, regard pornography as obscene because it reflects, for them,
an improper exercise of sexual function. But others, not sharing
those beliefs and attitudes, do not regard pornography as ob-
scene, 137 though they may think that other things, like depictions
of coprophagy, are obscene.
An obscenity law, then, must be understood as a political
expression of broader popular moral attitudes toward the puta-
tive proper use, and improper abuse, of the body. It is no accident
that such laws have been used to forbid the transport of aborti-
facient and contraceptive information 38 and dissemination of
sex manuals' 39 and to prosecute advocacy of contraception and
136 United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of
Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973). See also United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
137 See notes 67-70 supra & accompanying text. For a discussion of the studies relating
to divergent American responses to pornography, see supra note 85, at 195-215.
13' See note 31 supra; 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970)
(mail); 18 U.S.C. § 1462(c), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1462(c) (1970) (interstate commerce).
139 See, e.g., United States v. Chesman, 19 F. 497 (E.D. Mo. 1881). But cf. Walker v.
Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945); United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled
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population control. 140 The moral attitudes behind such laws, di-
rected against a supposed "abuse" of the body, were founded
on a compound of religious, psychological, and medical beliefs
basic to which was a deep fear of masturbation.141 Masturbation,
it was believed, led directly to physical debility and even death,
142
as well as crime and civil disorder.
43
In judicial interpretation of the notion of the obscene, courts
implicitly decide on and enforce popular attitudes about bodily
function. Whatever may be the constitutional legitimacy of regu-
lating obscene acts, it is impossible to see how regulating obscene
communications can avoid raising the deepest first amendment
problems. Because judicial application of obscenity laws neces-
sarily enforces a particular attitude, albeit presumably majori-
tarian, about the contents of communication, it seems to be ob-
noxious in principle to the central moral purpose of the first
amendment-to secure the greatest equal liberty of communi-
cation compatible with a like liberty for all. State prohibitions or
regulations of communication are permissible, on this analysis,
only to advance the system of greatest equal liberty. It is striking
to compare this analysis with that adopted by the Court in Roth
and reaffirmed in Miller and Paris Adult Theatre.
A. The Historical Status of Obscenity in
American Law
The classical approach to interpretation of the first amend-
ment is taken in two analytical steps. First, one asks whether the
federal or state prohibition or regulation applies to a communi-
cation of the sort protected by the "freedom of speech, or of the
press," guaranteed by the first amendment. Thus, displaying a
red flag has been held to be a form of protected "speech,"' 44 but
"Married Love", 48 F.2d 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d
Cir. 1930).
140See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, No. 14,571 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1879); Regina v. Bradlaugh, 2 Q.B.D. 569 (1877), rev'd on other grounds, 3 Q.B.D. 607
(1878). But cf Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Walker, 145 F.2d 33 (D.C.
Cir. 1944); United States v. One Book, Entitled "Contraception", 51 F.2d 525 (S.D.N.Y.
1931).
141 See text accompanying notes 71-83 supra.
142 Comstock, for example, noted the case of a thirteen year old girl, in whose bureau
he "found a quantity of the most debasing and foul-worded matter. The last heard from
this child she was in a dying condition, the result of habits induced by this foul reading."
A. COMSTOCK, TRAPS FOR THE YOUNG 139 (R. Bremner ed. 1967).
143 Comstock cited a number of instances where, in his view, access to obscene material
led to robbery, burglary, and murder. A. COMSTOCK, FRAUDS EXPOSED 437-39 (1880, re-
printed 1969). See also A. COMSTOCK, supra note 142, at 132-33, 169, 179.
144 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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burning draft cards is not a protected type of communication. 145
Assuming that protected speech is involved, one then asks wheth-
er the regulation or prohibition is justified by some clear or
present danger that the state has a right to prevent, 146 or by
some countervailing state interest which overbalances the inter-
est in free speech.' 47 The Supreme Court's consideration of the
application of free speech standards to the publication of ob-
scene materials 48  has notably focused on the first step in
the classic analytic approach, whether the obscene is protected
speech at all.'
49
The initial and fundamental decision considering the first
amendment issue involved in the control of allegedly obscene
materials was the consolidated case of Roth v. United States and
Albert v. California.150 Defining the obscene as "material which
deals with sex in a manner appealing to the prurient interest,"''
the court upheld the constitutionality of both the federal and Cal-
145 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
14 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The latest restatement of this
proposition applies to advocacy that is both directed to and likely to incite or produce
"imminent lawless action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
Cf. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., concur-
ring); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting).
See also M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1966).
"I Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); American Communications Asso-
ciation v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). But cf. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
141 The constitutionality of obscenity law has been assessed under other constitutional
provisions besides the free speech clause of the first amendment. Thus, a Michigan gen-
eral obscenity statute was struck down under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment because it prohibited the reading of books suitable for adults on the ground
that the books were not suitable for minors, Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), and
at least three Supreme Court justices now believe that much obscenity legislation should
be invalidated on due process grounds. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting with Stewart & Marshall, JJ., concurring in the dissent).
Applications of obscenity statutes have also been invalidated, at least in part, on grounds
of a constitutional right of privacy, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), and serious
constitutional argument has been advanced that the establishment of religion clause of
the first amendment is violated by obscenity statutes. Henkin, Morals and the Constitution:
The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 391 (1963). Nevertheless, the constitutional issues
surrounding obscenity inevitably gravitate toward the free speech clause of the first
amendment.
149 It is significant, in this connection, that in the few cases, all prior to Roth, focusing
on the second step, whether there is a clear and present danger of an evil that the state
may prevent or some countervailing interest, courts have failed to find sufficient grounds
to justify such prohibitions. See Roth v. United States, 237 F.2d 796, 801 (2d Cir. 1956)
(Frank, J., concurring), aff'd 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. &
C. 101 (1949) (Bok, J.), aff'd sub nom. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120,
70 A.2d 389 (1950).
sO 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
151 Id. at 487.
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ifornia laws. The court, speaking through Justice Brennan, ac-
knowledged that "[a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming
social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion . . ." are pro-
tected speech, 52 but, on the basis of the "history of the First
Amendment," it found that obscenity was not at all protected
speech 153 within the meaning of the first amendment. It is dif-
ficult to fathom how the Court supposed that the development
of obscenity law in the United States, which postdates the adop-
tion of the Bill of Rights, clarifies the purposes of the first amend-
ment.154 Colonial legislatures in America appear to have been
either unprovoked by155 or indifferent to' 5 6 obscenity. Justice
Brennan cited only one example of preconstitutional obscen-
ity law: an early Massachusetts law forbidding obscene or pro-
fane mockery of religious services.' 57 This law, however, is more
properly viewed as a religious establishment law than as a law
against obscene literature or art in general, 58 which is striking
when contrasted with the Puritan propensity to supervise pri-
vate conduct through the criminal law. 159 In any event, there ap-
pear to have been no prosecutions under this law 60 and when
Massachusetts set out to suppress the Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure in 1821, it relied on the common law misdemeanor of
obscene libel.16' There appear to have been no prior prose-
cutions under the common law in Massachusetts either;162 the
earliest American prosecution for common law obscene libel
was in 1815 in Pennsylvania.1
63
152 Id. at 484.
15s Id.
54 Cf Rogge, "The High Court of Obscenity" I, 41 U. COL. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1969). For
useful general accounts of early American developments, see Alschuler, Origins of the
Law of Obscenity, in UNITED STATES COMM'N ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, 2 TECHNI-
CAL REPORT 65, 73-79 (GPO ed. 1971); Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature,
52 HARV. L. REV. 40, 53-56 (1938); Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity,
and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 324-29 (1954).
"5See Alschuler, supra note 154, at 75.
256 See United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 801,806-09 (1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
M5 Act of March 19, 1712, ch. 6, § 19, 1 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF
MASS. BAY 682 (E. Ames & A. Goodell compl. 1869); Act of May 13, 1711, RECORDS
OF THE STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Mass. B. 2, Reel I 1661-1742,
Unit 7 (W.S. Jenkins ed. 1949) (microfilm).
258 But see Alschuler, supra note 154, at 74-75 (broader scope inferred from preamble).
"9See Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era, 42
N.Y.U.L. REV. 450, 450-58 (1967).
16
0 
See Alschuler, supra note 154, at 75.
161 Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336, 338 (1821).
262 See Alpert, supra note 154, at 53.
163 Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 S. & R. 91 (Pa. 1815); cf. Knowles v. State, 3 Day
103 (Conn. 1808) (dictum in case involving display of a monster).
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State laws regulating and prohibiting obscenity were adopted
only after the passage of the first amendment, as part of the nine-
teenth century Anglo-American concern over pornography. 164
The earliest law was a Connecticut statute of 1821.165 The first
federal legislation was a customs statute passed in 1842.166 Even
with these laws, prosecutions were relatively few until after the
Civil War167 when the Committee for the Suppression of Vice,
led by Anthony Comstock, took up the cudgels for purity in ear-
nest.1 68 In short, the evidence for obscenity law contemporane-
ous with the passage of the first amendment is tenuous at best.
Indeed, in the court of appeals Judge Frank argued that the
framers of the Constitution were rather tolerant of literature
that later generations regarded as obscene.'
6 9
In any event, the existence at the time of the adoption of the
first amendment of laws, such as that against seditious libel, has
never been supposed to conclude the question of the constitution-
ality of such laws. 170 The basis for the decision in Roth lies not in
history but in policy.
B. The Propositional Nature of Obscenity
The policy behind the Roth decision was that "the lewd and
obscene.., are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality
.... In effect, obscene speech was relegated by the Court to
a class of clearly communicative employments of speech which
the Court has held not to be "free speech" within the meaning
164 Cf. text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
161 Act of May, 1821, ch. 22, § 69, [1821] Conn. Star. Laws 165. Cf Act of Nov. 15,
1821, ch. 12, § 23, [1824] Laws of Vt. 271. An earlier statute, Act of Mar. 16, 1798, § 12,
[1800] N.J. Laws 331, cited in Roth, 354 U.S. at 483 n.13, was directed against all shows and
exhibitions for profit, not against obscenity in particular.
166 Act of Aug. 30, 1842, ch. 270, § 28, 5 Stat. 566.
167 See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 154, at 324.
168 For an account of the social history associated with this development, see P. BOYER,
PURITY IN PRINT: THE VICE-SOCIETY MOVEMENT AND BOOx CENSORSHIP IN AMERICA (1968).
169 237 F.2d at 806-09.
170 For a discussion of the crime of seditious libel at American common law, see L.
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960). For the view that seditious libel was abolished by the
first amendment, see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 272 (1952) (Black, J., dissent-
ing); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See
also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1941); Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 248-49 (1936) (first amendment prohibits taxes that restrict newspaper
circulation, although such taxes were employed in England and America at the time of the
adoption of the first amendment).
171 354 U.S. at 485 (quoting with approval Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942) (emphasis added by the Court)).
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of the first amendment. Other members of that class are "fighting
words", like the epithets "damned racketeer" and "damned fas-
cist;' 72 libels;17 3 and commercial uses of speech.'
7 4
It is quite clear that the Roth Court's observation applies most
strongly to the use of verbal obscenities as epithets. 7 5 Obscene
epithets are obviously nonpropositional; they are convention-
alized ways of expressing attitudes of disgust or contempt, which
depend for their effect on the impropriety of their use. 7 6 The
Court could not have meant, however, that such expressions are
not speech, within the meaning of the first amendment, merely
because they are nonpropositional. It is quite clear that many
forms of supposedly obscene materials, which Roth would put
wholly outside the protection of the first amendment, are propo-
sitional; much hard core pornography, for example, rather pre-
cisely describes certain acts in propositional terms. Conversely,
nonpropositional expressions are not per se excluded from the
protection of the first amendment; even obscene epithets have
been protected. 77 It is also clear that forms of art not expressible
in words alone or in words at all, such as motion pictures, are
within the protection of the first amendment. 78 Indeed, in Miller,
the Court conceded first amendment protection to any work,
even one with prurient appeal, that taken as a whole has "serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. '1 This concession
suggests that the prohibition of dodecaphonic music or modern
dance, although such art forms do not express formal proposi-
tions, would be unconstitutional. The first amendment, thus,
protects all communications, not just those in propositional form.
172 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). But cf. Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971) ("fighting words" statute invalidated for overbreadth as applied to a
conviction for wearing a jacket carrying the statement "Fuck the Draft").
173 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3006-07 (1974); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
174 See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942). But see Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971).
175 In the quoted portion of Chaplinsky, text accompanying note 171 supra, the Court
found support in Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 150 (1941). 315 U.S. at
572 n.5. By way of example, Chafee stated: "The man who swears in a street car is as much
of a nuisance as the man who smokes there. Insults are punished like a threatening ges-
ture, since they are liable to provoke a fight."
176 See text accompanying notes 32-38 supra.
177 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) ("Fuck the draft").
178 Jenkins v. Georgia, 94 S. Ct. 2750 (1974); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952); see R. RANDALL, CENSORSHIP OF THE MOVIES 9-32 (1968).
179 413 U.S. at 24.
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What, then, can the Supreme Court mean by saying in Roth
and reaffirming in Miller and Paris Adult Theatre that the obscene
does not express ideas and is not essential to their expression?
The claim seems at bottom to be that obscene expression is essen-
tially a form of saying something which can be equally well said
without using that form. The obscene is like an unpleasant per-
sonal mannerism, for instance, a belligerent tone, that bears no
real relation to the speaker's communicative intention. The idea
is that the content of an obscene expression may be equally well
expressed without being obscene: a pornographic depiction could
be expressed in colorless medical language that does not appeal to
prurient interest; or a novel dealing with the cruelties of sexuality
without emotion may equally well express its point without certain
vivid pornographic depictions.
180
But this view, once baldly stated, is clearly premissed on a
false philosophy of language as well as a false moral theory of the
first amendment. The meaning or communicative intention'
of an obscene expression is inextricably intertwined with its ob-
scene content. To remove the obscenity from an expression is pre-
cisely to remove an essential element of meaning. Verbal obscen-
ities, for example, carry a very special meaning which cannot be
captured in any other way. Consider reading the "Watergate
tapes" transcripts with the expletives restored. At one point Nixon
advised Haldeman and Ehrlichman to "use the most vicious libel
lawyer there is. I'd sue every (expletive deleted) (unintelligi-
ble)."' 8 2 It would surely impart a very different sense and re-
flect very differently on the mind of the former President if he
had said "I'd sue every unsavoury scoundrel who criticized the
Administration" than if he had used obscene epithets in place
of "unsavoury scoundrel."'183 Or consider Lenny Bruce's mono-
logues with the obscenities removed; the comic and satiric mean-
ing would not merely be modified, it would be completely trans-
formed.' 8 4 Similarly, the use of the obscene in literature-the
depictions of excretion and the like in Pope' 8 5 and Swift' 86 come
180 This notion seems to be the basis for the test of overall or predominant effect:
whether the objectionably obscene passage is part of an overall nonobscene effect. 413
U.S. at 24.
181 For a systematic development of this notion of meaning, see S. SCHIFFER, MEAN-
ING (1972); Grice, Meaning, 66 PHILOs. REV. 377 (1957).
182 THE WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPTs 737 (G. Gold ed. 1974).
183 Cf. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L.
REV. 153, 188-92 (1972).
184 For the prosecutor's view of Bruce, see R. KUH, supra note 57, at 175-211.
18- See notes 27 & 36 supra.
186 See note 35 supra.
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to mind-gives precise expression to the satirical disgust which
is part of the complex communicative intentions of these works.
To eliminate the obscene from such works, as in Bowdler's ex-
purgations of Shakespeare,18 7 impoverishes and distorts their
meanings.
Hence, a prohibition of the obscene is a prohibition on a
certain kind of meaning. It is fundamentally unreasonable to
say, as the Supreme Court did in Roth and reaffirmed in Miller
and Paris Adult Theatre, that this is not an essential form of speech
within the meaning of the first amendment. It is precisely that;
by outlawing it, the Court makes criminal a certain content of
communication.
If the Court does recognize the expressive function of the
obscene, it must then be saying that this type of content in com-
munication is without constitutional value. This view appears to
be confirmed by either the test of obscenity employed in the Roth
line of cases or that propounded in Miller. In Roth, Justice Bren-
nan described obscenity as "utterly without redeeming social im-
portance,"' 88 and in A Book Named 'John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts,189 he specified that one part
of the test for obscenity was whether or not the material was
"utterly without redeeming social value."'190 Under this test, even
material with a dominant appeal to a prurient interest in sex, and
patently offensive to contemporary community standards, might
not be illegally obscene, if it had any redeeming value. In Miller,
however, Chief Justice Burger explicitly disavowed the "utterly
without redeeming social value" test, permitting a finding of ob-
scenity if the work "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value."' 9 '
But by what criteria is value judged? It should be clear by
now that there is no evidence, of a generally acceptable empirical
kind, that hard core pornography is without value. 192 On the
contrary, various dispassionate empirical studies show that the
use of hard-core pornographic materials has a significant and
187 W. SHAKESPEARE, THE FAMILY SHAKESPEARE (Ist ed. T. Bowdler ed. 1807).
18s 354 U.S. at 484.
189 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
190 383 U.S. at 418.
19' 413 U.S. at 24-25.
See, e.g., G. GORER, supra note 19, at 217-31; REPORT, supra note 85, at 41, 154-
63, 266-70; Money & Athanasiou, Pornography: Review and Bibliographic Annotations, 115
AM. J. OBSTET. & GYN. 130, 143-46 (1973); cf. Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10
WAYNE L. REV. 655 (1964). See also Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Obscenity,
112 U. PA. L. REv. 834, 850 (1964).
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valued function in the life of many Americans. 193 In saying that
the obscene is not constitutionally protected at all, and in identi-
fying the obscene with the pornographic,19 4 the Court at bottom
takes its standards of value from majority moral attitudes. In so
doing, the Court violates the central moral value of the first
amendment, that majority attitudes per se are not a constitution-
ally valid basis for regulating or prohibiting expressive communi-
cations.
In an important sense, therefore, the Court's obscenity de-
cisions are profoundly political 95 and violate the ideal of neutral
principles of constitutional adjudication.1 96 There is today in
America substantial and growing disagreement regarding many
questions of sexual and personal morality, 97 a few of which have
already surfaced dramatically in major constitutional adjudica-
tions.1 98 Part of this disagreement is over notions of proper sex-
ual function, with serious arguments being proposed for major
constitutional attacks on various statutes regulating sexual func-
tion. 99 The revaluation of the obscene is one aspect of this de-
191 See note 192 supra; M. GOLDSTEIN & H. KANT, PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL DE-
VIANCE 147-53 (1973); N. PoLSxY, HUSTLERS, BEATS, AND OTHERS 186-202 (1967); RE-
PORT, supra note 85, at 128-34. The typical pornography users in America appear to
be white, middle aged, married males who had comparatively less sexual experience in
adolescence than the norm. REPORT, supra note 85, at 128-34.
194 See note 58 supra & text accompanying notes 127-29 supra.
19 Thus, attempts to exclude the obscene from the protection of the first amend-
ment on the ground that the obscene is in no sense political fail even on their own prem-
ises. For such an attempt, see Anastaplo, Obscenity and Common Sense: Toward a Definition
of "Community" and "Individuality", 16 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 527, 551-52 (1972).
'16 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1959). For the debate engendered by this article, see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 49-65 (1962); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L. J. 421
(1960); Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
637, 652-55 (1961); Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication,
27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 (1960); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply
to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959); Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly
Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971).
197 See, e.g., R. BELL, PREMARITAL SEX IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (1966); BEYOND
MONOGAMY (J. Smith & L. Smith eds. 1974); DEP'TAL COMM. ON HOMOSEXUAL OF-
FENSES & PROSTITUTION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND
PROSTITUTION REPORT CMND. No. 247 (1957) (Wolfenden Report); D. KLAICH,
WOMAN PLUS WOMAN (1974). Among the numerous books on the general topic of-
changing sexual morals are L. LIPTON, THE EROTIC REVOLUTION (1965); W. REICH,
THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION (4th ed. rev. 1969).
199 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception).
199 See, e.g., W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (1973); Special
Student Contribution, Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273,
295-99 (1971); Comment, Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to
Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 581, 599-603 (1967).
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bate. 00 In this context, pornography can be seen as the unique
medium of a vision of sexuality, a "pornotopia"20 1-a view of
sensual delight in the erotic celebration of the body, a concept
of easy freedom without consequences, a fantasy of timelessly
repetitive indulgence. In opposition to the Victorian view that
narrowly defines proper sexual function in a rigid way that is
analogous to ideas of excremental regularity and moderation, 20 2
pornography builds a model of plastic variety and joyful excess
in sexuality. In opposition to the sorrowing Catholic dismissal of
sexuality as an unfortunate and spiritually superficial concomi-
tant of propagation,2 0 3 pornography affords the alternative idea
of the independent status of sexuality as a profound and shatter-
ing ecstasy.2
0 4
Within the perspective of the evolving national debate over
sexual morality and the Supreme Court's repeated support of an
"uninhibited marketplace of ideas, ' 205 it is difficult to see why
the pornographic vision should not have a place in the market-
place of ideas beside other visions that celebrate the life of the
mind, the sanctity of ascetic piety, or the usefulness of prudent
self-discipline. 20 6 In excluding the pornographic vision from the
marketplace, the Court fundamentally fails to make a "morally
neutral judgment.., of obscene material... ,,207 for in applying
2 ' See H. ELLIS, THE REVALUATION OF OBSCENITY, in MORE ESSAYS OF LOVE AND
VIRTUE 103-42 (1931); M. ERNST & W. SEAGLE, To THE PURE ... 250-62 (1928); Good-
man, supra note 69; cf. D. LOTH, THE EROTIC IN LITERATURE 187-89 (1961).
201 I take the word from S. MARCUS, supra note 49, at 216, 268-74. See also P. MICHEL-
SON, THE AESTHETICS OF PORNOGRAPHY 1-13, 233-41 (1971).
201 See notes 74-85 supra & accompanying text.
403 See notes 71-74 supra & accompanying text.
204 Pornography is also seen as the unique medium for giving expression to the
transcendence of the personality by sexual transgression. S. SONTAG, STYLES OF RADI-
CAL WILL 35-73 (1969); cf. S. DEBEAUVOIR, MUST WE BURN SADE? (A. Michelson transl.
1953)
205 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945). The marketplace concept is attributable to Justice Holmes. Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
206 One argument that could be made in this connection is that pornographic ma-
terials are unequal combatants on the battlefield of truth and, accordingly, must be
forbidden; otherwise the opposing ideas would have no fair chance. Given the panoply
of rituals and traditions which opposing ideas can and do appeal to, it is difficult to see
how this argument could be taken seriously without putting restrictions on the appeal to
rituals and traditions. Even assuming the argument deserves attention, its appeal rests on
one of two unspoken, and morally unspeakable, assumptions: either the object of com-
petition among conflicting ideas is not the victory of truth, at least if that truth is obscene,
or any view that appeals to man's baser instincts is presumptively less valuable than its
innate competitive advantage would indicate. It should be obvious that these arguments
are simply more manifestations of non-neutral principles of adjudication.
207 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973).
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the concept of the obscene it affirms one moral and political view
and denies another.
To argue from the social value of pornography is to meet
the Court on its own terms and to dispute the outcome of its
balancing test. One may equally reject the constitutional validity
of the balancing approach itself; indeed, the contractarian mor-
al theory of the first amendment requires us to do so. The moral
basis of the first amendment is not merely a utilitarian calculus
of the political usefulness of a debate on divergent points of
view. Rather, the first amendment rests more fundamentally on
the moral liberties of expression, conscience and thought; these
liberties are fundamental conditions of the integrity and com-
petence of a person in mastering his life and expressing this
mastery to others. The freedom to determine the contents of
one's communications is fundamental to this mastery. Without
this freedom, one lacks a basic ingredient of self-determination.
There is no reason whatsoever to believe that the freedom
to determine the sexual contents of one's communications or to be
an audience to such communications is not as fundamental to
this self-mastery as the freedom to decide upon any other com-
municative contents. On the contrary, one of the central aims of
developing methods of sex therapy in our culture is to help
couples in "learning to communicate ... in an area that hereto-
fore in our culture has been denied the dignity of freedom of
communication. '20 8 That obscenity law has been a traditional
instrument of this denial is explicit in the historic utility of obscen-
ity laws for attacking sex education and instruction,20 9 as well as
in the recent attempts to ban pornography per se. The conse-
quence of these assaults is not only a denial of a reasonable un-
derstanding of the varieties of pleasurable sexual function, 10
but also a crippling debasement of the human capacity to master
one's sexual life in the light of independent judgment.
Viewed in this manner, it is clear that the obscene falls within
the protection of the first amendment and should be accorded
whatever protection is given other forms of speech.2 1' The rele-
208 W. MASTERS & V. JOHNSON, HUMAN SEXUAL INADEQUACY 204 (1970).
209 See notes 31, 138-40, supra & accompanying text.
210 Thus, some popular sex manuals recommend the use of pornography. E.g., THE
JOY OF SEX 208-09 (A. Comfort ed. 1972). Interestingly, the Commission on Obscenity
and Pornography adopted its proposal for the liberalization of obscenity law in light of its
recommendations of the need for better sex education. REPORT, supra note 85, at 47-48,
58, 265-79. For an identical view, see B. RUSSELL, supra note 69, at 93-117.
21 For related arguments leading to similar conclusions, see M. ERNST & W. SEAGLE,
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vant constitutional question, therefore, is whether restrictions on
the obscene are coherent with the principle of the greatest equal
liberty of communication compatible with a like liberty for all.
C. Equal Liberty and the Protection
of Moral Standards
Initially, it is important to be clear how the constitutional
principle of equal liberty, as formulated and derived in this Arti-
cle, is to be understood. In deriving the principle, we observed
that the value of free expression turned on the existence of de-
veloped capacities of rational choice.212 Thus, the principle is not
intended to apply to persons presumably lacking rational capaci-
ties, such as children. In addition, the liberty of communication
was so interpreted that the liberty of expression correlates with
the liberty of others to choose to be or not to be an audience. It
follows, therefore, that there should be no constitutional objec-
tion on free expression grounds to the reasonable regulation of
the distribution of obscene materials to children.213 Similarly,
the state could prohibit the distribution of photographic por-
nography involving minors as subjects, because the child sub-
jects could not have made a rational choice and their exploitation
is not to be encouraged by permitting their exploiters to obtain
the fruits of what is justifiably regarded as a crime.2 14 Nor is there
any objection to the reasonable regulation of the obtrusive dis-
tribution of the obscene, in order to protect the liberty of persons
not to be an audience, if they so choose. 21 5 But this argument is
far different from the attempt, in Paris Adult Theatre, to justify the
general prohibition of the obscene because of "the interest of the
public in the quality of life and the total community environment,
[and] the tone of commerce in the great city centers .... ,,21 6 Any
interest of this kind hardly justifies a general prohibition of all
supra note 200, at 188-286; T. SCHROEDER, "OBSCENE" LITERATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 74-128 (1911).
212 See text accompanying notes 94-98 supra.
213 It may be, however, that there are good empirical reasons for believing that such
laws are not justified as a matter of sound policy. See, e.g., Larsen & Wolfgang, State-
ments, in REPORT, supra note 85, at 375-77.
214 The same rationale would apply to any obscene depiction obtained by the use of
nonconsenting subjects.
215 Cf Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 681
(1963). Compare Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), with Martin v. Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (1943). The qualification regarding reasonable avoidability rests on the moral
idea that a person cannot be heard to complain when he has voluntarily and rationally
undertaken to inflict a pain or offense on himself. See, D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note 15,
at 177-79; cf. Feinberg, supra note 60, at 103-04.
216 413 U.S. at 58.
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pornographic materials. At most, it would justify some form of
regulatory zoning of the place of sale of such materials and some
kind of restriction on their obtrusive sale. 17
Having formulated the relevant moral and constitutional
principle to permit some reasonable restrictions on complete in-
dividual freedom, we must recall that any qualification of liberty
of expression can be justified only on the basis of facts ascertain-
able by generally acceptable empirical methods.2 18 One quite
relevant set of facts would be empirical support for the view that
publication and use of obscene materials are "social poisons,
' 219
leading directly to disease, death, crime, and social disorder-in
short, the Victorian view.220 Were these beliefs true, or even
supported by substantial evidence, it is obvious that the princi-
ple of equal liberty would justify restrictions on obscene mate-
rials. In such circumstances the circulation of obscene materials
would, of necessity, undermine the constitutional order of equal
liberties. Certain of these Victorian beliefs, such as that regard-
ing the evils of masturbation, are regarded today as medically
ludicrous. 22 1 There remains an intuition, though, that pornog-
raphy threatens the public safety. In Paris Adult Theatre Chief
Justice Burger advances this sort of argument, citing a minority
report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography
222
that "indicates . . . at least an arguable correlation between ob-
scene material and crime. 2 2 3 In a manner that can only be re-
garded as disingenuous, the Court flatly ignores the great body
of empirical evidence that shows there to be no empirical basis
for such a view. 224 Without the requisite empirical foundation,
217 For a proposed statute and a discussion thereof, see R. KUH, supra note 57 at
269-79.
218 See text accompanying note 105 supra.
219 The metaphor of poison was particularly favored by Anthony Comstock. See,
A. COMSTOCK, supra note 143, at 388-89; A. COMSTOCK, supra note 142, at 174, 175, 179,
182, 206, 242.
220 See notes 74-83 supra & accompanying text.
221 See, e.g., A. COMFORT, supra note 76, at 69-113. For statements of the normality
and useful functions of masturbation, see SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND PERSONALITY CHARAC-
TERISTICS 239-76 (M. DeMartino ed. 1963). For statistical background, see P. GEBHARD,
J. GAGNON, W. POMEROY & C. CHRISTENSON, SEX OFFENDERS 486-514 (1965); A. KINSEY,
W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE, 497-516 (1948);
A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN & P. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
FEMALE 132-90 (1953).
222 In fact, the main focus of the Hill-Link Minority Report is the argument from
protecting moral standards discussed below. See Hill & Link, Statements, in REPORT, supra
note 85, at 383, 385-86.
223 413 U.S. at 58.
224 See, e.g., P. GEBHARD, J. GAGNON, W. POMEROY, & C. CHRISTENSON, supra note 221,
at 403-09, 669-92; REPORT, supra note 85, at 215-43; cf. M. GOLDSTEIN & H. KANT, supra
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the supposed threat to the public safety provides no justification
for restricting the circulation and use of obscene materials.
One set of facts for which there is evidence, however, seems
to allow at least some prohibition of the obscene consistent with
the equal liberty principle. These facts relate to those special cir-
cumstances where the use of verbal obscenities as direct personal
insults is clearly likely to lead to physical violence, thus causing
a breakdown of the relations of equal liberty.225 This quite specific
set of facts, which justifies only a very narrow qualification to the
constitutional protection of obscene speech, has, however, been
supposed by the Supreme Court to render the obscene outside
the protection of the first amendment altogether.226 This argu-
ment is certainly among the more unfortunate examples of bad
judicial reasoning, for it commits the obvious fallacy of overgen-
eralization and quite blatantly misuses authority to justify an un-
supportable result.
It would appear, then, that no general prohibition of obscene
communications seems justifiable on the basis of the facts capable
of empirical confirmation. One final kind of argument, however,
has been supposed by the Court to justify such a general prohi-
bition, the argument from preserving moral standards. Having
laid out his arguments from the "tone of commerce" and from
"public safety," Justice Burger next proposes the general argu-
ment that society can forbid all access to pornographic materials
in order to protect moral standards. The majority opinion cites
in extenso227 a statement of Professor Bickel to the effect that to
allow people consensually to gather to view such materials, in a
way not obtrusive on others,
is to affect the world about the rest of us, and to impinge
note 193, at 139-53. Indeed, Denmark's experience was that repeal of its obscenity statute,
as applied to consenting adults, lowered the rate of sex crimes. See REPORT, supra note 85,
at 230-32; Ben-Veniste, Pornography and Sex Crime: The Danish Experience, in UNITED
STATES COMM'N ON OBSCENITY & PORNOGRAPHY, 7 TECHNICAL REPORT 245 (1971); Kut-
schinsky, Towards an Explanation of the Decrease in Registered Sex Crimes in Copenhagen,
in id. 263. For a summary of earlier studies, see Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censor-
ship; The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV.
1009 (1962).
225 Compare Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), with Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
226 See notes 171, 172, & 175 supra & accompanying text. The Court's reliance in Roth
on the quoted portion of Chaplinsky, 354 U.S. at 485, which in turn relies on Chafee's
work, 315 U.S. at 572 n.5, is misplaced. Chafee viewed these facts as justifying applica-
tion of the "clear and present danger" test, or some variation thereof, but not as putting
the obscene outside the protection of the first amendment altogether. See Z. CHAFEE,
GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 49-61 (1947).
227 413 U.S. at 59.
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on other privacies [for] [e]ven supposing that each of us
can, if he wishes, effectively avert the eye and stop the
ear (which, in truth, we cannot), what is commonly read
and seen and heard and done intrudes upon us all, want
it or not.2 2
8
If the substance of this argument is that permitting any form
of disapproved conduct between or among consenting adults vio-
lates the rights of privacy of those who disapprove of this conduct,
it is surprising that it can be supposed by the Court to deserve
any weight whatsoever. How, precisely, is my right of privacy vio-
lated by the consensual conduct of others? This argument
amounts to nothing more than the claim that knowledge of the
existence of certain disapproved conduct suffices without more
to justify legal prohibition of that conduct. Further evidence or
reasoning of any kind is unnecessary. As such, it is an extension of
the traditional argument, urged by Stephen2 29 against Mill230 and,
more recently, by Devlin231 against Hart.232 But the traditional
argument at least assumed that the condemned conduct had a
weakening effect on society. At bottom, this argument rests on
the crude moral confusion between an obtrusive offense and the
offense derived from the mere knowledge of something. It must
be rejected not only because it is intellectually indefensible, but
also because its conclusions are morally outrageous. It would di-
lute the moral force of liberty into the empty and vapid idea that
people be allowed to do that to which no one has any serious ob-
jection.233 It would elevate every form of popular prejudice, big-
otry, and intolerance, without more, into a moral basis for law. The
Court has consistently and rightly rejected such arguments.
234
Majority attitudes per se, unsupported by reasoning of any intel-
ligible kind, do not rise to the dignity of moral reasoning which
228 Bickel, 22 PUB. INTEREST 25-26 (1971). For a discussion of the damaging effects
of pornography on the viewer or reader, see Steiner, Night Words: High Pornography and
Human Privacy, in PERSPECTIVES ON PORNOGRAPHY 96 (D. Hughes ed. 1970).
229See J. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 135-78, esp. 138-39 (R. White
ed. 1967).
23
0 J.S. MILL, supra note 98, at 91-113, esp. 100-01. See also W. VON HUMBOLDT, THE
LIMITS OF STATE ACTION 55-70 (J. Burrow ed. 1969).
231 p. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
22 H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963).
233 Cf id. 46-47.
234 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception for unmarried persons); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (miscegenation); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segregated education).
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can justify deprivation of liberty. 235 They are merely intractable
prejudices which the state should circumscribe where it is neces-
sary to protect the system of equal liberties, rather than elevate
into law.
23 6
If this argument is wrong as applied to acts, it is even more
palpably so as applied to communications. The first amendment
rests on the moral status and weight of freedom of expression.
Notwithstanding the attitudes of the majority, free expression
is granted to the most despised minorities who advance causes
condemned by the majority. To appeal to the unfounded atti-
tudes of the majority, as this argument seems to do, in order to
restrict the free expression of the unpopular minority, is precisely
to withhold the value of free expression where it is most urgently
required.
There is another form of this argument, however, that is not
similarly objectionable in moral and constitutional principle,
which the Court most likely had in mind.237 According to this
form of the argument, there are certain demonstrable moral vir-
tues or character traits which citizens of a stable constitutional
democracy must have. Because obscenity, as a necessary factual
matter, undermines these virtues, it leads to the breakdown of the
constitutional order of equal liberties. Therefore, it is justifiable
to prohibit obscenity on grounds of the equal liberty principle.
238
While this argument has the general form of an acceptable
moral and constitutional argument for limiting free speech, it is
fundamentally circular, and its empirical premises are not, in fact,
supported by evidence. Its circularity derives from unexamined
assumptions. For example, it identifies the virtues required for
democratic citizenship with the virtues specified by a quite special,
23s For an account of moral reasoning, see D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 75-292.
236 Cf Barnett, Corruption of Morals, 2 LAw & Soc. ORDER 189-243 (1971); Dworkin,
Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966).
2'7 See 413 U.S. at 59-60, where the court refers to the maintenance of a "decent
society."23' The best statement of this view is H. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY
(1969). See also Berns, Pornography vs. Democracy: The Case for Censorship, 22 PUB. INTEREST
3 (1971); Kristol, Pornography, Obscenity and the Case for Censorship, N.Y. Times, Mar.
28, 1971, § 6 (Magazine), at 24; Elliot, Against Pornography, HARPER'S MAG., Mar. 1965,
at 51; van den Haag, in CENSORSHIP: FOR AND AGAINST 143 (1971); van den Haag, Quia
Ineptum, in "To DEPRAVE AND CORRUPT", supra note 18, at 109. For a general state-
ment of this approach to the analysis of first amendment adjudications, see W. BERNS,
FREEDOM, VIRTUE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 228-257 (1965). For the great classical
statements of the position today defended by these authors, see PLATO, THE REPUBLIC
321-59 (F. Cornford transl. 1945); J.-J. ROUSSEAU, LETTER TO M. D'ALEMBERT ON THE
THEATRE (A. Bloom transl. 1960).
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religiously informed sexual morality2 39 that regards pornography
as repugnant to its narrow definition of proper sexual func-
tion.2 40 It also assumes that pornography disconnects sex and love
in a damaging way.2 4 1 These assumptions will not bear critical
examination, however. There is no reason whatsoever to identify
the virtues of democratic citizenship-public spiritedness, civic
responsibility, democratic tolerance, mutual respect-with the
virtue of rigid abstinence from pornographic material. 242 In-
deed, there is no consensus in our culture that such abstinence
is a virtue; 243 even some religiously informed sexual moralities
are now tolerant of obscene materials.2 44 Further, unless one
begs the question and assumes that love is properly defined by
one narrow view of its proper expression, there is little empirical
reason to suppose that pornography disconnects sex and love in
a damaging way. On the contrary, some suppose that pornog-
raphy may be a healthy influence, expressing a frank under-
standing of the integrated relation of emotion and its bodily ex-
pressions.
245
Surely good citizenship is compatible with many sexual styles
and moralities. Indeed, one might suppose that the virtues of
democratic tolerance and mutual respect are fostered by prac-
ticing tolerance toward different sexual moralities and by insis-
tence on maintaining constitutional liberties of free speech for
all groups.
246
In any event, sexual moraites and pornography cannot be
treated as unified phenomena. Different behaviors and materials
appeal to different tastes. Even if the Court should conclude that
one class of materials, sadistic obscenity for example, does have
a deleterious effect on some fundamental democratic virtue, such
as mutual respect, that conclusion would have no bearing on
239 On the notion of sexual morality, see Ruddick, On Sexual Morality, in MORAL
PROBLEMS 85 (J. Rachels ed. 1971).
24' Namely, a certain kind of disciplined, child-rearing, marital heterosexuality. See,
e.g., text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
241 See Kristol, supra note 238, at 24, 112.
242 For a similar distinction, see R. McKEON, R. MERTON & W. GELLHORN, THE FREED-
OM TO READ 23-24 (1957).
243 See note 69 supra.
244 See, e.g., A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 433 (app. to opinion of Douglas, J., concurring; an address
by a clergyman urging that Fanny Hill is a moral piece of literature); cf. Jones, Statement,
in REPORT, supra note 85, at 374.
245 See note 210 supra.
246 See generally J. RAWLS, supra note 86, at 453-62; D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note 15,
at 242-78.
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other types of obscene materials, such as depictions of cunnilin-
gus, that have no ramifications for democratic virtues. Further-
more, although it is plausible that sadistic materials imply a lack
of mutual respect in sexual relations, in order to justify the sup-
pression of even sadistic materials the Court would have an obli-
gation to find that attitudes in sexual fantasy cause destructive
civic attitudes and behavior. According to the "outlet" theory of
aggressive fantasy, however, quite the contrary would be true.
247
In fact, there is no evidence of any generally accepted em-
pirical kind that access to pornography in general has an adverse
effect on character traits.2 48 People's capacity for responsible be-
havior and moral sensitivity does not seem to be affected by access
to pornography. Nor is there any evidence that access to por-
nography causes social or cultural breakdown.249 Without evi-
dence on these matters, the argument from preserving civic
virtues is untenable. The presumption must be in favor of un-
restricted freedom of expression; restrictions must be justified
by appeal to convincing empirical evidence.
In depending on the argument from preserving moral stan-
dards to support its decision, then, the majority of the Court must
be erecting some special notion of sexual morality into constitu-
tional law. But on what constitutional basis does it do so? There
are, no doubt, certain sexual moralities, based on special religious
perceptions,250 which sharply condemn access to pornography.
Special a priori religious perceptions of this kind, however, are
not constitutionally admissible in interpreting the application of
the equal liberty principle. 251 Accordingly, such perceptions can-
not be the basis of a constitutional justification of limitations on
247 For example, de Sade himself, when released from the torments of his prison
life, refused to use legal power to seek vengeance on his tormentors and was notable in
his time for advocating abolition of the death penalty. G. GORER, supra note 19, at 210.
248 See REPORT, supra note 85, at 202.
249 The argument that it does lead to social breakdown, as suggested in J. STEPHEN,
supra note 229, and P. DEVLIN, supra note 231, rests on the idea that the stability of a society
logically or factually depends on that class of religious beliefs which find pornogaphy
obnoxious. Cf. Rex v. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B. 1727); P. SOROKIN, THE AMERICAN
SEX REvoLUTION (1956). Whatever may have been the plausibility of this view when mor-
ality was closely identified with theological premises, cf. note 114 supra, as an abstract
argument it fails to have even superficial plausibility today. See H.L.A. HART, supra
note 252; Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morals, 35 U. CHI. L. REv.
1(1967).
'50 E.g., the claim of Charles H. Keating, Jr., that it suffices to condemn pornography
that it is against God's law. Keating, Statement, in REPORT, supra note 285, at 511, 515, 547.
221 For such an argument, see H. GARDINER, supra note 41, at 564-68. Gardiner ac-
knowledges the principle that freedom can only be limited to advance freedom, but ac-
knowledges higher freedoms involving special Catholic notions of sexual function. It
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free speech. To the extent that the Court's acquiescence in gen-
eral prohibitions of pornography depends solely on such percep-
tions, it violates the fundamental moral rationale of the free
speech and free press clause of the first amendment, and raises
serious independent constitutional questions under the establish-
ment of religion clause.252
Finally, Justice Burger argues that just as there is no conclu-
sive evidence to support many laws, such as antitrust, securities
regulation, and educational support laws, which have been held
to be constitutionally justifiable, so the absence of evidence to sup-
port the obscenity laws cannot be used to attack their constitution-
ality.253 This argument confuses the lack of conclusive evidence
with the lack of any evidence whatsoever. There is certainly evi-
dence of a general theoretical and factual kind for the laws and
institutions that Burger cites; there is no comparable evidence
regarding the effects of obscenity. Burger's argument, if ac-
cepted, invites acquiescence in the most intractable prejudices,
dismissing all evidence as irrelevant. It undermines the whole idea
of rationality in legislation, substituting a notion of tradition that
is a mask for ignorance and intolerance. The invalidity of this argu-
ment is even more extreme in the light of the values underlying
the first amendment. Because the principle of equal liberty is
fundamental to a moral theory of society, a higher burden of
proof than is required in ordinary economic legislation is surely
appropriate to justify legislation restricting that liberty.254 Yet,
the Court allows the abridgement of equal liberty in the absence
of any substantial evidence and on the basis of appeals to majority
attitudes-precisely what the first amendment forbids.
CONCLUSIONS
A constitution both reflects and establishes the moral order
of a society. Consequently, there is an intellectual need to harness
does not, of course, follow from the application of such a principle to himself that a Cath-
olic necessarily applies it to other groups who do not share the religious perceptions un-
derlying the condemnation. For an example of such a Catholic view, see Murray, Literature
and Censorship, in THE FIRST FREEDOM. 215 (R. Downs ed. 1960).
For a Catholic attempt to present empirical evidence, see M. LORANG, BURNING ICE:
THE MORAL AND EMOTIONAL EFFECTS OF READING (1968). Cf P. JOHNSON, ON INIQUITY
(1967); F. WERTHAM, SEDUCTION OF THE INNOCENT (1953). In general, Johnson and
Wertham patently confuse causation and correlation.
252 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); W. BARNETT, supra note 199, at
74-93; Henkin, supra note 148.
253 413 U.S. at 60-63.
254 Of course, the Court by refusing to include obscenity in the class of expression
protected by the first amendment, avoids the necessity of applying the strict evidentiary
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moral theory to constitutional theory. This Article has tried to
show how a moral and philosophical theory of free expression
fundamentally clarifies the problem of constitutional adjudication
of the first amendment. On the view presented here, recent ob-
scenity decisions, Miller and Paris Adult Theatre, are based on de-
fective moral and legal analysis, wholly failing to explain why first
amendment protection is not extended to the obscene. The Court
could not have reached these decisions had it given precise
thought to the nature of the obscene and the force of the moral
theory behind the constitutional guarantees of free expression.
Obviously, this Article has not established a complete moral
theory of the first amendment. The casuistry presented is far too
sketchy. But the account, as a kind of preliminary sketch, suggests
that some such theory, unifying intellectual principle with prac-
tical application, is possible. That moral and philosophical analy-
sis can be a powerful force in understanding evolving legal ideas
should be wholly unsurprising.2 55 If morals are .the spirit of the
law, careful moral analysis will inevitably bare the law's deepest
intentions.
test normally applied to restrictions on protected forms of speech. See, e.g., Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
255 In addition to the moral theory here employed, a related moral theory which
may clarify legal ideas is that of R.M. Hare. See, R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON (1963).
My contrary remarks in Richards, supra note 2, at 71 n.159 were ill-considered, and I
withdraw them with apologies to Professor Hare. Indeed, Professor Hare's theory may
be understood as a kind of application of the contractarian theory here employed. For
a discussion of the relation of the views, see B. BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE
12-13 (1973); D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 83-85; Hare, Rules of War and Moral
Reasoning, 1 PmLOS. & PUB. AFFAIRS 166, 167-71 (1972).
